Iran's FM stresses Syria’s sovereignty despite Khamenei’s resistance call

Carried out by the Ministry of Intelligence under President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, these killings sought to silence critics deemed threats to the state, continuing into the presidency of Mohammad Khatami.

In 1999, the Ministry of Intelligence officially—but only partially—admitted responsibility for four of the murders.

Q: Who were the dissidents killed by intelligence ministry agents?

Five individuals whose murders in November and December 1998 drew national and international attention were:

• Majid Sharif: A translator and journalist.
• Dariush Forouhar: Leader of the Pan-Iranist Nation Party of Iran.
• Parvaneh Forouhar (Eskandari): Activist and wife of Dariush Forouhar.
• Mohammad-Jafar Pouyandeh: Member of the banned Iranian Writers Association.
• Mohammad Mokhtari: Member of the banned Iranian Writers Association.

The Ministry officially acknowledged responsibility for the killings of Dariush and Parvaneh Forouhar, Mohammad Mokhtari, and Mohammad-Ja’far Pouyandeh, but denied involvement in other cases, including Pirouz Davani’s death.

Q. How were the victims killed and where were their bodies found?

Majid Sharif’s body was found on the side of a road in Tehran on November 19, 1998, six days after he disappeared. Authorities claimed heart failure as the official cause of his death.

Dariush and Parvaneh Forouhar were stabbed to death in their Tehran home on November 22. Both sustained multiple stab wounds, suggesting the attack was both deliberate and exceptionally violent.

Mokhtari’s body was discovered on December 3 near a cement factory on a road south of Tehran, several days after he went missing.

Pouyandeh’s body was found in a field in Shahriyar, also south of Tehran, on December 8, a day after he left his office in the capital to return home.

Both bodies showed signs of strangulation, though the authorities never officially confirmed the cause of death.

Q: Were the killings limited to those in November and December 1998?

No. At the time, political groups and media outlets suspected the intelligence ministry of involvement in numerous other assassinations, often disguised as overdoses, car accidents, or unexplained stabbings.

The suspected victims of these systematic assassinations were primarily opponents of the Islamic Republic, including dissident politicians, literary figures, and translators. Others reportedly targeted included an Armenian, three Protestant priests, followers of the banned Bahá'í faith, a prominent university professor with no known political affiliations, and civilians allegedly linked to the intelligence ministry’s covert operations.

Q: When did government-linked murders begin and end?

Many believe the "Chain Murders" began with the killing of Dr. Kazem Sami, who served as minister of health in the first post-revolution cabinet in 1979.

Dr. Kazem Sami was stabbed to death in his medical practice in 1988. The individual accused of his murder reportedly died by suicide in prison. Years later, former President Akbar Rafsanjani, in his memoirs, referenced the alleged killer’s death, fueling further questions about the case.

Some activists and advocates argue that the "Chain Murders" never truly ceased, with allegations of systematic killings resurfacing in recent years.

Prominent filmmaker Kioumars Pourahmad, whose body was found without a suicide note in April 2023, and Dariush Mehrjui and his wife, who were fatally stabbed in their Karaj home in October 2023, have been cited as possible victims of a renewed wave of targeted killings.

Q: Who did the authorities blame for the murders?

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his supporters initially blamed “foreign enemies,” including Israel, for the murders of the Forouhars and the two writers.

Public outcry over these particular killings, however, put pressure on the so-called reformist government of President Mohammad Khatami.

At Khatami's insistence, a three-member independent team was established to investigate the killings. The committee ultimately confirmed suspicions of the intelligence ministry’s direct involvement.

On January 4, 1999, the ministry issued an unprecedented statement partially acknowledging responsibility by blaming “rogue” agents for four of the murders and describing the killings as “despicable and abhorrent.”

This limited admission prompted further scrutiny, as the intelligence ministry operates under the authority of Khamenei, raising questions about how such "rogue" actions could occur without his knowledge.

Q: What happened to the “rogue agents”?

Three top officials of the ministry—Saeed Emami, Mostafa Kazemi, and Mehrdad Alikhani—along with several agents, were charged with ordering and carrying out the assassinations.

Emami, widely regarded as the mastermind behind the killings, allegedly died by suicide in prison before his trial.

The remaining defendants were tried in Tehran's military court. Sentences ranged from qisas (death penalty) to life imprisonment, with some receiving as little as two and a half years.

Q: Were the death sentences carried out?

No. Judiciary authorities stated that the victims’ families had waived their Sharia-based right to qisas for the killers. This act of pardon spared the defendants from execution.

Q: Did the revelation of the ministry’s role in the killings affect the minister?

Ghorban-Ali Dorri-Najafabadi, a minister favored by Khamenei, who at the time had not yet fully consolidated his power as Supreme Leader, was forced to resign. He was replaced by the relatively moderate Ali Younesi.

Najafabadi has consistently denied any knowledge of the assassinations. However, some defendants in the case rejected this claim, stating that the "physical elimination" of targets identified by higher authorities was part of their job description.

In his 1999 trial, prominent reformist cleric and politician Abdollah Nouri accused Najafabadi of being aware of the killings.

The report, titled “Women and the Death Penalty in Iran: A Gendered Perspective,” sheds light on systemic gender disparities and judicial bias affecting women on death row.

It highlights that many women executed for murder acted out of desperation in response to violence, rape, or coercive control, with about 70% of cases involving male partners.

The report noted that Islamic Republic's legal system rarely considers mitigating circumstances, as women’s testimonies are worth half of men’s, and laws fail to address domestic violence or marital rape.

“The execution of women in Iran reveals not just the brutality of the death penalty, but the depth of systemic gender inequality in the judicial system,” said Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam, director of IHR. He called on the international community to act urgently to address “systemic injustices and gender apartheid” in Iran.

The report also revealed that transparency around executions has worsened, with only 26% of women’s executions officially announced, a figure dropping to 12% in recent years.

Marginalized ethnic minorities, including women from Sistan and Baluchistan, are disproportionately represented among those executed, reflecting the intersection of poverty, discrimination, and judicial bias.

Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has used executions to maintain power and instill fear, IHR said, underscoring the need for international attention to systemic injustices and the plight of women on death row.

IHR emphasized that the report does not account for the significant number of female political prisoners executed during the 1980s, nor does it include women subjected to stoning or hanging for adultery during the first three decades of the Islamic Republic.

Iran witnessed a stark rise in executions in 2024, with at least 930 death sentences carried out, according to the Washington-based Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran.

The figure for years 2023 and 2022 were 811 and 579 respectively, which shows a consistent upward trend.

Last week Baku summoned Tehran's interim chargé d'affaires to demand an end to what it called "provocative actions" by Tehran. It followed a fervent anti-Baku speech by a lay Shia eulogist or religious singer, Gholamreza Gholizadeh, at an event in Ardabil, the capital of the northwestern province of the same name.

Tehran-Baku relations are very complex due to religious, ethnic, economic, and political factors including Tehran’s good relations with Armenia, its other northwestern neighbor, and Baku's strong ties with Iran's archenemy, Israel.

The maddah and his controversial speech

Gholizadeh, who leads a Shia mourning society in Ardabil that organizes ceremonies to honor Shia saints—delivered most of his speech in Turki, a language spoken in Iran's northwestern provinces that Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Azerbaijan easily understand.

During his speech, he referred to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as “bastards” and “consumers of illegitimately acquired food.”

The event, broadcast live by Iran’s state-run News Network, was attended by Seyyed Hassan Ameli, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative in the province.

Gholizadeh also declared that Iran would reclaim its former territories in the Caucasus—lost during the Russo-Persian Wars (1651-1828)—and raise the Shia flag there. He further insulted early Islamic figures revered by Sunnis.

Over half the population of the Republic of Azerbaijan follows Shia Islam, but political power largely rests with Sunnis. Baku media often allege that radical Shia groups, such as Hüseynçilər (The Islamic Resistance Movement of Azerbaijan), receive backing from Iran.

The Ardabil event—the first of its kind in the Islamic Republic’s history—commemorated the “martyrs of the Battle of Chaldiran” in 1514. The battle between Iran’s Safavid Shia Empire and the Sunni Ottoman Empire ended in an Ottoman victory.

Criticism of authorities for giving free reign to maddahs

In an editorial on Monday titled “Are Maddahs Free to Say Whatever They Want and Insult Whoever They Wish?” the conservative newspaper Jomhouri Eslami criticized the insults directed at Azerbaijan’s president as both politically and religiously inappropriate.

According to Shia law, calling a person "a bastard" is an offense punishable by eighty lashes.

The newspaper also questioned the relevance of holding an event to commemorate the victims of the Battle of Chaldiran and criticized the failure of provincial authorities, including Ameli, to oversee and regulate such events. All government-approved gatherings in Iran are strictly monitored to ensure compliance with existing policies, though occasional lapses may occur during religious ceremonies.

Ameli who is also a member of the Assembly of Experts and the Friday prayer leader of Ardabil, appointed by Khamenei, took to X on Friday, two days after Baku’s strong reaction to the incident, to argue that the “inappropriate language” used by the maddah should not be construed as representing the Islamic Republic’s official stance.

Ameli’s post received nearly 350 comments, with opinions divided. While some supported the maddah’s highly controversial remarks, others criticized Ameli for failing to intervene during the speech, which he had praised as “epic.”

Critics alleged close ties between Ameli and the maddah’s religious group, with one commenter among the hundreds asking, “Were you not there? Why did you let him swear and insult? Stop this bragging and focus on the country’s progress. We will get nowhere with war and enmity.”

Another user, Gholamreza Tabrizi, claimed to have heard the full audio recording of the speech and warned that, if published, it could spark a diplomatic crisis with Sunni Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, because of its anti-Sunni content.

Under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s three-decade leadership, eulogists have gained prominence in both religious and political spheres. Many “celebrity eulogists” are closely affiliated with ultra-hardline political factions and use state-sponsored events, including Friday prayers, to promote their views.

“The most inappropriate language, the most irrelevant stances, and the most unconventional topics are often raised during Friday sermons,” wrote Hossein Selahvarzi, a former head of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, in an X post addressing the Ardabil incident. “These actions frequently have repercussions for the country’s diplomatic apparatus and economy.”

Also criticizing the authorities for the recent incident in Ardabil, Mohsen Gharavian, a conservative politician and cleric, warned the authorities about the political and religious implications of maddahs’ increasing involvement in politics.

“The country’s key political authorities, such as the Supreme National Security Council … should warn these maddahs and thwart such divisiveness to prevent damages and political and social problems in the current sensitive situation in the region,” he said in an interview with the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) published Sunday.

Mohammadreza Zafarghandi added that the government plans to offset currency-driven price hikes by compensating insurance companies to prevent patients from bearing the cost.

Iran is grappling with a dire economic situation as the rial, which has depreciated by over 30% since September, sending ripple effects across multiple industries including the pharmaceutical industry, which heavily relies on the cash-strapped government for hard currency to import raw materials.

While Zafarghandi promised government action on rising medicine costs, Mehdi Pirsalehi, head of the Food and Drug Organization revealed that the government owes 360 trillion rials (approximately $4.47 billion) to the pharmaceutical sector, alongside 200 trillion rials ($2.48 billion) in medical equipment debt.

In July last year the head of Tehran Chamber of Commerce for Industries, Mines and Agriculture (TCCIMA) warned that Iran’s pharmaceutical and medical equipment sectors are struggling to secure both foreign currency and local rials, in an interview with the state-affiliated ILNA news website.

In 2022, Iran’s parliament decided to scrap an annual $9 billion subsidy for essential food and medicines, despite warnings of more inflation and hardship.

The subsidy was introduced in April 2018 when Donald Trump signaled his intention to withdraw from the Obama-era nuclear agreement with Iran known as JCPOA, and Iran’s national currency began to nosedive.

Before becoming Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian criticized the Raisi administration for eliminating government subsidies, warning that such measures would hinder drug manufacturers from importing the raw materials needed to produce medicines.

Now, as president, Pezeshkian himself plans to cut the allocation for importing essential goods, including agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, and raw materials, to €12 billion, according to the 2025 budget outline released in October.

“The developments in Syria, given their importance and sensitivity, will certainly be among the key items on the agenda during this visit,” Esmail Baghaei said Monday.

Baghaei also reiterated Iran's position on Syria, emphasizing the importance of respecting the Syrian people's decisions.

“Whatever the Syrian people decide must be respected by all countries in the region. Protecting Syria's territorial integrity, unity, and sovereignty is vital for us and the entire region,” he said.

Baghaei stressed that Syria's future must be determined without foreign interference and free from terrorism and violent extremism.