Iran-backed Hezbollah to bury Nasrallah after 60-day ceasefire with Israel

The announcement signals a continued emphasis on the administration’s tough approach on Tehran but comes with Trump’s acknowledgment of past tensions with his appointee.

“I am pleased to announce Morgan Ortagus as Deputy Special Presidential Envoy for Middle East Peace… Early on Morgan fought me for three years, but hopefully has learned her lesson,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. “She will hopefully be an asset to Steve [Witkoff, Trump’s Special Envoy to the Middle East].”

Ortagus is recognized as a significant figure in US foreign policy, serving as the State Department spokesperson during Trump’s presidency. In this role, she communicated US positions on global issues, often focusing on Iran, China, and the Middle East.

She expressed hope in a tweet after being appointed that under Trump peace and stability will return to the Middle East.

A hardline approach to Iran

Ortagus consistently echoed and defended the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran. This policy aimed to isolate Tehran diplomatically and economically following the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA) in 2018.

Ortagus argued that the sanctions undermined Iran’s ability to fund regional proxy groups and its missile development program.

She supported the US exit from the JCPOA, describing the agreement as inadequate in addressing Iran’s regional interventions and nuclear ambitions.

"Under the current trajectory, the Iranian regime will get a nuclear weapon in the next administration unless we have a president with the fortitude to stop it," said Ortagus in an exclusive interview with Iran International in June.

Ortagus highlighted the US’s backing of domestic protests in Iran, attributing the country’s economic and social struggles to the government’s policies.

"Khamenei's thugs killed 1,500 Iranians on the streets of Iran last November,” Ortagus wrote, quoting one of Khamenei's tweets in August 2020. “At least 23 were children. They deserved freedom and a future.”

She was referring to the fall of 2019, when widespread protests broke out across Iran following a sudden threefold increase in gas prices. Thousands of protesters were arrested. Many victims sustained gunshot wounds to the upper chest, indicating that security forces were operating under shoot-to-kill orders.

Ortagus has consistently portrayed Iran’s missile program as a global threat and accused Tehran of supporting militant groups.

Joining a team led by Steve Witkoff, Ortagus’s appointment comes at a time of heightened tensions in the Middle East. Her focus on pressuring Tehran aligns with Trump’s broader foreign policy objectives.

85-year-old Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's method of projecting power abroad and tightening his grip at home appeared to be working.

What a difference a year makes.

Tehran's affiliates Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah have been decimated by Israel while Islamist rebels hostile to Iran toppled Syria's Assad dynasty, a key ally.

Iran is now adrift in a decisive year, Kamran Matin, an international relations scholar at the University of Sussex told the Eye for Iran podcast.

“All of this has come together and created a very difficult environment for the Islamic Republic, all of which is even more difficult to deal with in light of the Supreme leader's deteriorating health and his age,” said Matin.

Iran’s regional and international strategy is closely tied to how it can control and shore up influence domestically.

Part of the modus operandi of the Iranian system is to blame domestic troubles on sanctions and regional conflicts, promising that investment in nuclear infrastructure and militant proxies can buttress its standing in a dangerous neighborhood.

That rationale, Matin said, has evaporated and the mystique of Iran’s regional strength has lost its luster.

There have been 54 anti-government protests in Iran since Dec 26 and Jan 2 of this year according to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a Washington DC-based think tank critical of the Islamic Republic.

Iran now faces a sobering realization of its diminished stature.

Race for a deal, or the bomb?

Up against deepening economic malaise as Iran’s currency slips to new lows, an energy crisis which has stoked protests and the loss of regional muscle which deterred enemies, Iran’s rulers now have limited options.

They are at a crossroads, with each path presenting huge risks: race toward a nuclear bomb as an ultimate security guarantee or make concessions to President Donald Trump and compromise the state's very raison d'etre as a scourge of empire.

The answer may hinge on Trump’s plan for Tehran, a country that according to American intelligence has allegedly plotted to kill him.

The president-elect, who has surrounded himself with Iran hawks for his next administration has suggested bombing Iran into “smithereens" for the alleged assassination attempt.

At the very least, Trump will likely apply maximum pressure and more economic sanctions on an already crippled economy, which would squeeze Iran's rulers further.

“It's unclear how Iran is able to negotiate with some sort of strength to be able to extract any concession from the United States and Western powers,” said Matin.

Iranian officials and state media Iran moot talks with Trump more eagerly, tamping down their former rhetoric of resistance and confrontation.

That could signal fear amongst the ruling elite and an understanding of their weakened position, said Matin.

In a speech last month after the collapse of Assad, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei addressed a somber crowd, blaming Israel and the United States for Iran not intervening to save its ally.

“Khamenei basically declared this impotence that American and Israelis had closed all the roads and so on and so forth,” said Matin on the speech, which was devoid of Khamenei's usual affirmations of strength.

The last standing in the Axis of Resistance - the Houthis

The Islamic Republic's woes may mean an opening for the Americans like never before that could force Iran to bargain away its regional satrapies, or face attack.

“Trump is much more willing to take on Iran, given how Israel has basically neutralized Iran's proxy forces,” said Matin on the changing tides.

Yemen's Houthis, Iran's last relatively robust military ally, will likely be a priority.

The Iran-backed group has fired drones and missiles towards Israel frequently for over a year, describing it as an act of solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Maritime Attack Tracker recently tallied 106 confirmed Houthis strikes on shipping since November 2023.

"There have been many more attacks recently on (the Houthis) by Israel and the US-led coalition," Matin said.

"So it may well be that they will also be pacified over time, especially if Iran itself is weakened. And maybe one of the elements in the future talks between Iran and the US would be Iran stopping its supply of advanced weapons to Houthis."

Indirect impact of Trump: a loss of Russia for Iran?

The return of president-elect Trump to the White House will likely mean yet more bad news for Iran’s Islamic establishment.

One of Trump’s first goals is to fulfill his promise to end the war in Ukraine.

If Trump follows through as he is forecasted to, Iran will lose leverage with key ally Russia, another partnership that helped it project power on the world stage.

That would lead to another major blow to the Islamic Republic.

“Russia is likely to restore its damaged relations with the West, with the United States in particular," Matin said. "That also means in turn that Russia does not necessarily need to accommodate Iran's demands or needs in order to keep Iran on board in terms of supplying drones and other weapons to Russia to be used in Ukraine.”

Ukraine's foreign ministry in early September said Russia had launched 8,060 Iran-developed Shahed drones at Ukraine since 2022, according to a Reuters report.

Syria, formerly an Iranian satellite state, was another issue binding Moscow and Tehran.

"Both of them were involved supporting Assad regime. Neither of them are there anymore. What really binds Iran and Russia together is this wider tension each of these countries have with the West, with the United States,” Matin said.

It seems with Iran's dwindling influence, domestic unrest and battered allies throughout the region, 2025 is poised to be a decisive year for Tehran.

To watch the full Eye for Iran episode with Kamran Matin, click on YouTube or listen on Spotify, Apple, Amazon, Castbox or any other major podcast platform.

A convoy carrying construction materials and logistical reinforcements was seen heading to Kobani on Thursday, according to the SDF-affiliated North Press Agency.

The convoy included prefabricated structures, trench-digging machinery, surveillance equipment, and fuel tanks as reported by the New Region.

It comes amidst renewed violence in areas controlled by the SDF, following Turkey-backed forces' campaigns that began in late November which have resulted in significant casualties and displaced thousands of civilians.

The recent ousting of the Assad government, led by the Turkey-backed rebel coalition Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, has reshaped the region.

The collapse of Assad on December 8 marked the end of his family's five-decade rule, presenting a strategic setback for Iran.

Syria has historically served as a key conduit for Iran to supply Hezbollah in Lebanon and bolster its military allies in the region. The loss of this corridor undermines Tehran's regional influence and disrupts its long-standing strategy in the Levant.

Iran’s deep military and financial commitments in Syria now face diminishing returns. Rival actors such as Turkey and Persian Gulf Arab states are poised to fill the void, further isolating Hezbollah and compelling Tehran to reconsider its regional posture amidst intensifying domestic economic pressures.

Turkey has intensified its efforts to capture strategic locations from the SDF, including Kobani and the Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates River. Backed by Turkish warplanes, these operations underscore Ankara's intent to neutralize what it views as a security threat posed by the Kurdish-led forces. Despite these efforts, the SDF has so far resisted the advances.

As the US's primary ally in the fight against ISIS, the SDF controls nearly a quarter of Syrian territory, primarily in the northeast and east. However, Turkey continues to press for the disarmament of the group, insisting that it poses a direct risk to its national security.

“A record was recorded in the number of detainees involved in espionage-related affairs for the Iranians, when there was an increase of about 400% of the number of detainees from 2023,” a statement said.

“During the year, 13 serious espionage affairs by Israelis were exposed and thwarted for the Iranian intelligence agencies, and serious indictments were filed against 27 Israelis.”

It also detailed attempts to smuggle weapons along with attempts to recruit Israelis to carry out missions and cyber attacks on Israeli targets.

Asher Ben Artzi, the former head of Israel’s Interpol, told Iran International, "Personally, I can say that in the past, to find Israelis who would be willing to betray the country for the sake of money, was very rare, but unfortunately today this is not the case. Iranian intelligence has acted in a smart way and succeeded in locating such Israelis."

He said that in spite of the fact many such people have been assigned smaller tasks to begin with, that is only the beginning. "We must not take lightly the simplicity of the tasks assigned to them by the Iranian operators such as spraying graffiti or taking photographs. The future tasks are always more complex."

Lior Akerman, a former Brigadier General in Shin Bet now based at Reichman University, said Iran has changed the pattern of its operations in recent years, relying on digital means to reach possible candidates.

"Due to the impossibility of meeting Israelis and recruiting them abroad, they deploy a very wide network of searches on social networks using fake profiles," he said.

"They reach out to many thousands, from whom they find a few who are willing to carry out operations for money."

Just this week, a 29-year-old Israeli man was arrested on suspicion of spying for Iran.

A joint statement from Israel’s security services and the police, said that Alexander Granovsky, from Petah Tikva, was arrested in December for his alleged involvement in a plot which had involved photographing the entrance to former defense minister Benny Gantz's residential neighborhood.

He is also accused of setting eight cars on fire around Israel and photographing a sensitive facility in the center of the country.

Granovsky had also sprayed "Children of Ruhollah” on various buildings, referring to Iran’s first Supreme Leader, Ruhollah Khomeini.

The investigation also revealed that the man’s handlers discussed with him the possibility of obtaining a rifle and grenades to shoot at houses.

Like other cases this year, he had also been asked to gather information on the residential addresses of ministers in the Israeli government, and to set fire to a police car, a bus, and a truck, but Granovsky refused to carry out the tasks.

In September, another plot was foiled to assassinate Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar.

The plot escalated following the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July, according to Shin Bet.

The Iranian scheme also included plans to target former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and other senior Israeli defense figures, although the details have not been confirmed.

The operation sought to exploit an Israeli businessman with extensive ties to both Turkey and Iran, leveraging his financial networks to facilitate the assassination attempts within Israel.

Although such operations have been attempted by Iran for more than a decade, since the Gaza war, efforts have increased. Iran's military allies in both Gaza and the West Bank continue to act against Israel in addition to those outside Israel's borders in Lebanon and the wider Middle East.

As of December 30, Armenian border guards have replaced Russian personnel who managed the checkpoint for over three decades.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced the transition on his official Facebook page, acknowledging the service of Russian border guards and extending his wishes to the Armenian forces now in charge.

“From today on, border control is carried out only by the officers of the Republic of Armenia Border Guard Forces at the Agarak border crossing point of Armenia-Iran state border. Until now, since Armenia's independence, border control was carried out by the Russian Federation Border Guard troops officers at Agarak crossing point, and I want to thank them for their service. And I wish success and good service to our border guards who have taken over border control from today,” Pashinyan said as reported by the Newsweek.

The decision follows an agreement between Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin during an October 8 meeting. As part of the arrangement, Armenian forces will also begin managing border security with Turkey and Iran from January 1, 2025.

The move is part of broader changes in Armenia-Russia relations, which include the withdrawal of Russian guards from Zvartnots International Airport and other border locations.

Armenia’s decision to assume greater responsibility for its borders comes amid shifting alliances and a reevaluation of its reliance on Moscow, particularly after Russia’s limited response to recent conflicts involving Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In March, Yerevan called for the withdrawal of Russian guards from key locations, citing heightened tensions with its traditional ally.

The transition also reflects broader geopolitical currents. Armenia’s ties with Iran, a key regional ally, remain strong, with cooperation in energy and trade bolstering relations. The two nations share a 44-kilometer border, and Iran views Armenia as a strategic counterbalance to Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Tehran has consistently emphasized its interest in maintaining stability along its northern border, where regional conflicts often intersect with ethnic and religious divisions.

The decision has drawn criticism from Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which warned that the shift could undermine Armenia’s security and economic stability. Despite these warnings, Armenian officials maintain that the change represents a step toward greater sovereignty.

The evolving dynamics in the South Caucasus suggest continued realignment. Armenia’s recalibration of its defense and foreign policy could have lasting implications, particularly as it navigates tensions with Azerbaijan and manages its alliances with Iran and the broader international community.