Iran International
The "chain murders" of the 1990s—a series of assassinations targeting Iranian dissidents and intellectuals—claimed at least 80 lives and stand as a dark chapter in the Islamic Republic's history of extrajudicial killings.
Carried out by the Ministry of Intelligence under President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, these killings sought to silence critics deemed threats to the state, continuing into the presidency of Mohammad Khatami.
In 1999, the Ministry of Intelligence officially—but only partially—admitted responsibility for four of the murders.
Q: Who were the dissidents killed by intelligence ministry agents?
Five individuals whose murders in November and December 1998 drew national and international attention were:
The Ministry officially acknowledged responsibility for the killings of Dariush and Parvaneh Forouhar, Mohammad Mokhtari, and Mohammad-Ja’far Pouyandeh, but denied involvement in other cases, including Pirouz Davani’s death.
Q. How were the victims killed and where were their bodies found?
Majid Sharif’s body was found on the side of a road in Tehran on November 19, 1998, six days after he disappeared. Authorities claimed heart failure as the official cause of his death.
Dariush and Parvaneh Forouhar were stabbed to death in their Tehran home on November 22. Both sustained multiple stab wounds, suggesting the attack was both deliberate and exceptionally violent.
Mokhtari’s body was discovered on December 3 near a cement factory on a road south of Tehran, several days after he went missing.
Pouyandeh’s body was found in a field in Shahriyar, also south of Tehran, on December 8, a day after he left his office in the capital to return home.
Both bodies showed signs of strangulation, though the authorities never officially confirmed the cause of death.
Q: Were the killings limited to those in November and December 1998?
No. At the time, political groups and media outlets suspected the intelligence ministry of involvement in numerous other assassinations, often disguised as overdoses, car accidents, or unexplained stabbings.
The suspected victims of these systematic assassinations were primarily opponents of the Islamic Republic, including dissident politicians, literary figures, and translators. Others reportedly targeted included an Armenian, three Protestant priests, followers of the banned Bahá'í faith, a prominent university professor with no known political affiliations, and civilians allegedly linked to the intelligence ministry’s covert operations.
Q: When did government-linked murders begin and end?
Many believe the "Chain Murders" began with the killing of Dr. Kazem Sami, who served as minister of health in the first post-revolution cabinet in 1979.
Dr. Kazem Sami was stabbed to death in his medical practice in 1988. The individual accused of his murder reportedly died by suicide in prison. Years later, former President Akbar Rafsanjani, in his memoirs, referenced the alleged killer’s death, fueling further questions about the case.
Some activists and advocates argue that the "Chain Murders" never truly ceased, with allegations of systematic killings resurfacing in recent years.
Prominent filmmaker Kioumars Pourahmad, whose body was found without a suicide note in April 2023, and Dariush Mehrjui and his wife, who were fatally stabbed in their Karaj home in October 2023, have been cited as possible victims of a renewed wave of targeted killings.
Q: Who did the authorities blame for the murders?
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his supporters initially blamed “foreign enemies,” including Israel, for the murders of the Forouhars and the two writers.
Public outcry over these particular killings, however, put pressure on the so-called reformist government of President Mohammad Khatami.
At Khatami's insistence, a three-member independent team was established to investigate the killings. The committee ultimately confirmed suspicions of the intelligence ministry’s direct involvement.
On January 4, 1999, the ministry issued an unprecedented statement partially acknowledging responsibility by blaming “rogue” agents for four of the murders and describing the killings as “despicable and abhorrent.”
This limited admission prompted further scrutiny, as the intelligence ministry operates under the authority of Khamenei, raising questions about how such "rogue" actions could occur without his knowledge.
Q: What happened to the “rogue agents”?
Three top officials of the ministry—Saeed Emami, Mostafa Kazemi, and Mehrdad Alikhani—along with several agents, were charged with ordering and carrying out the assassinations.
Emami, widely regarded as the mastermind behind the killings, allegedly died by suicide in prison before his trial.
The remaining defendants were tried in Tehran's military court. Sentences ranged from qisas (death penalty) to life imprisonment, with some receiving as little as two and a half years.
Q: Were the death sentences carried out?
No. Judiciary authorities stated that the victims’ families had waived their Sharia-based right to qisas for the killers. This act of pardon spared the defendants from execution.
Q: Did the revelation of the ministry’s role in the killings affect the minister?
Ghorban-Ali Dorri-Najafabadi, a minister favored by Khamenei, who at the time had not yet fully consolidated his power as Supreme Leader, was forced to resign. He was replaced by the relatively moderate Ali Younesi.
Najafabadi has consistently denied any knowledge of the assassinations. However, some defendants in the case rejected this claim, stating that the "physical elimination" of targets identified by higher authorities was part of their job description.
In his 1999 trial, prominent reformist cleric and politician Abdollah Nouri accused Najafabadi of being aware of the killings.
Last week Baku summoned Tehran's interim chargé d'affaires to demand an end to what it called "provocative actions" by Tehran. It followed a fervent anti-Baku speech by a lay Shia eulogist or religious singer, Gholamreza Gholizadeh, at an event in Ardabil, the capital of the northwestern province of the same name.
Tehran-Baku relations are very complex due to religious, ethnic, economic, and political factors including Tehran’s good relations with Armenia, its other northwestern neighbor, and Baku's strong ties with Iran's archenemy, Israel.
The maddah and his controversial speech
Gholizadeh, who leads a Shia mourning society in Ardabil that organizes ceremonies to honor Shia saints—delivered most of his speech in Turki, a language spoken in Iran's northwestern provinces that Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Azerbaijan easily understand.
During his speech, he referred to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as “bastards” and “consumers of illegitimately acquired food.”
The event, broadcast live by Iran’s state-run News Network, was attended by Seyyed Hassan Ameli, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative in the province.
Gholizadeh also declared that Iran would reclaim its former territories in the Caucasus—lost during the Russo-Persian Wars (1651-1828)—and raise the Shia flag there. He further insulted early Islamic figures revered by Sunnis.
Over half the population of the Republic of Azerbaijan follows Shia Islam, but political power largely rests with Sunnis. Baku media often allege that radical Shia groups, such as Hüseynçilər (The Islamic Resistance Movement of Azerbaijan), receive backing from Iran.
The Ardabil event—the first of its kind in the Islamic Republic’s history—commemorated the “martyrs of the Battle of Chaldiran” in 1514. The battle between Iran’s Safavid Shia Empire and the Sunni Ottoman Empire ended in an Ottoman victory.
Criticism of authorities for giving free reign to maddahs
In an editorial on Monday titled “Are Maddahs Free to Say Whatever They Want and Insult Whoever They Wish?” the conservative newspaper Jomhouri Eslami criticized the insults directed at Azerbaijan’s president as both politically and religiously inappropriate.
According to Shia law, calling a person "a bastard" is an offense punishable by eighty lashes.
The newspaper also questioned the relevance of holding an event to commemorate the victims of the Battle of Chaldiran and criticized the failure of provincial authorities, including Ameli, to oversee and regulate such events. All government-approved gatherings in Iran are strictly monitored to ensure compliance with existing policies, though occasional lapses may occur during religious ceremonies.
Ameli who is also a member of the Assembly of Experts and the Friday prayer leader of Ardabil, appointed by Khamenei, took to X on Friday, two days after Baku’s strong reaction to the incident, to argue that the “inappropriate language” used by the maddah should not be construed as representing the Islamic Republic’s official stance.
Ameli’s post received nearly 350 comments, with opinions divided. While some supported the maddah’s highly controversial remarks, others criticized Ameli for failing to intervene during the speech, which he had praised as “epic.”
Critics alleged close ties between Ameli and the maddah’s religious group, with one commenter among the hundreds asking, “Were you not there? Why did you let him swear and insult? Stop this bragging and focus on the country’s progress. We will get nowhere with war and enmity.”
Another user, Gholamreza Tabrizi, claimed to have heard the full audio recording of the speech and warned that, if published, it could spark a diplomatic crisis with Sunni Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, because of its anti-Sunni content.
Under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s three-decade leadership, eulogists have gained prominence in both religious and political spheres. Many “celebrity eulogists” are closely affiliated with ultra-hardline political factions and use state-sponsored events, including Friday prayers, to promote their views.
“The most inappropriate language, the most irrelevant stances, and the most unconventional topics are often raised during Friday sermons,” wrote Hossein Selahvarzi, a former head of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, in an X post addressing the Ardabil incident. “These actions frequently have repercussions for the country’s diplomatic apparatus and economy.”
Also criticizing the authorities for the recent incident in Ardabil, Mohsen Gharavian, a conservative politician and cleric, warned the authorities about the political and religious implications of maddahs’ increasing involvement in politics.
“The country’s key political authorities, such as the Supreme National Security Council … should warn these maddahs and thwart such divisiveness to prevent damages and political and social problems in the current sensitive situation in the region,” he said in an interview with the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) published Sunday.
