Iran’s Mahsa movement (2022-2023) was a non-violent uprising aimed at overthrowing the Islamic rule established in 1979. The government’s sole response was to suppress the protestors because of the movement’s objective.
The reported death toll of 550 protesters far exceeds the regime's claims of slain special forces and Basij members, whose actual number has never been officially disclosed. In some cases, slain protesters were misreported as Basij members. The protests did not target businesses or government institutions, except for police cars that fired on people.
The government managed to suppress the movement by arresting up to 22,000 individuals, using birdshot against protesters blinding many, killing children and teenagers. Vigilantes or government agents also deployed unexplained chemical substances against schools, sending thousands of teenagers to hospitals. The Mahsa movement, driven by anger from the 2017 and 2019 uprisings, saw the Islamic government and its auxiliaries respond with extreme measures, including kidnapping, killing, executing, and torturing its most defiant participants.
After two years of repression, rising tensions with Israel, and the removal of the Raisi administration, what is the current state of the “woman, life, freedom” movement? Is it in a coma, hibernation, or bubbling like lava under a volcano?
Desperation, despair, or hidden anger?
Iranian society exhibits signs of all three conditions: desperation, despair, and hidden anger. The migration of educated and skilled professionals, including doctors and nurses, has surged. The low voter turnout for Pezeshkian, a candidate promising more of Khamenei's policies, reflects a sense of desperation rather than hope.
In national strikes by oil, gas, and steel workers, as well as nurses, teachers, and retirees, the prevalent sentiment is one of despair over current conditions rather than active anger. Social media discussions also show less anger.
This suggests that the Mahsa movement's protesters have come to terms with the regime’s persistence and the improbability of overthrowing it through their current methods. Incidents like the murder of Armita Gravand killed during a confrontation with hijab enforcers, Arzoo Badri’s severe injury, the brutal killing of Mohammad Mir Mousavi, and numerous other acts of police brutality have failed to spark street protests, as government opponents have accepted the reality of their situation.
Disappointed but realistic society
A 2023 nationwide government survey, shared with select correspondents, reveals that 91.8 percent of people are dissatisfied with the country's current conditions and direction. While the failure of the Mahsa movement to overthrow the government is acknowledged, this does not imply that the populace has forgotten their demands or their dire situation. The survey also indicates that at least 30.2 percent of respondents view the current situation as irreparable under the Islamic Republic, suggesting that, despite the obstacles, they see regime change as the only path to improvement.
Two different kinds of hope
The 60.6 percent of people currently hoping for change, according to the government survey, differs from the 70 percent who supported reformist president Mohammad Khatami in 1996. Khatami's support stemmed from hopes for stability and economic relief after the upheaval of the revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. In contrast, today’s hope is not connected to the Pezeshkian administration. The current desire for reform focuses on substantial and real transformation. Given the failure of partial and gradual reforms over the past 45 years, many believe that meaningful change through such methods is no longer feasible and aim for a fundamental change in the role of the government and its treatment of citizens. The severe suppression of the Mahsa movement has further diminished hopes for realistic reform.
Obstacles to popular action
There are major obstacles that hinder the unification of the 60% seeking significant change with the 30% advocating for regime change.
Social activism among Iranians has given way to individualism because of the authoritarian nature of the Islamic system. The government is suspicious of non-religious activism, which is not under its control. While during sudden waves of protests crowds spontaneously congregate, organized opposition is rare. Security organs systematically crack down on any signs of organization and many opponents have turned to hopes of seeing a savior, or a major regional conflict or military attack that can topple the regime.
Even charity work has declined in the country, because of constant government crackdowns on independent NGOs.
The protests in 2017, 2019, and 2021 were triggered by specific events, such as the rise in gasoline prices and the killing of Mahsa Amini by the morality police. This suggests that societal movements are driven by immediate sparks and waves rather than a cohesive, long-term strategy to address Iran's decline. Additionally, effective leadership is lacking.
The underlying discontent within society is like lava beneath the surface, which is why the government has hesitated to again raise gasoline prices. However, the absence of independent organizations and media to channel this dissatisfaction into street protests has left society in a state of political inaction. The constant emigration of protesting youth further weakens the protest movement. The government neither has the means to address the brain drain and skilled labor emigration nor views it as a security threat. In some instances, interrogators even encourage detainees to emigrate.
In an audio message to Iran International, Amjad Amini, Mahsa Amini's father, expressed his family's wish to hold a memorial service. He noted that he has received countless messages and calls from the public about organizing a commemoration for Mahsa, emphasizing that "everyone wants" to gather at her gravesite.
Meanwhile, pressure on political and civil activists is intensifying ahead of the second anniversary of the Iranian revolutionary uprising.
Mahsa Jina Amini was arrested by the so-called morality police on September 13, 2022 over the state’s mandatory hijab law. Amini was beaten while in their custody and later succumbed to her injuries three days later at Kasra Hospital in Tehran.
Following her death, protests initially erupted in Tehran and quickly spread to various other parts of Iran – quickly dubbed the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement.
It’s estimated, by several human rights organizations, that during the nationwide months-long protests, at least 551 protesters, including 68 children and 49 women, were killed by the state’s security forces.
In recent days, as the second anniversary of the Iranian uprising approaches, the Islamic Republic's security agencies have intensified their crackdown on political, labor, and civil activists. This latest wave of repression and arrests has been particularly severe in Kurdistan, Mahsa Amini's home province, more so than in other parts of Iran.
On September 13, the Coordinating Council of the Iranian Teachers' Trade Associations reported that 14 labor activists from the teachers' union in Kurdistan had been summoned to the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor's Office in Sanandaj and other security agencies in the city.
Two years on, no changes on women’s rights
Two years since the movement began, analysts have pointed out that there have been no positive changes in the government's approach and behavior towards women and dissent.
The Islamic Republic persists in enforcing its strict policies on hijab and social conduct and, in some instances, has intensified these restrictions and pressures. The state has also moved to tighten mandatory hijab laws, increase surveillance on dissent, and more harshly crack down on those who oppose these regulations.
In a piece for Iran International’s Persian site, political activist Mahdieh Golroo argues that the Mahsa Zhina movement has sparked significant change in Iranian society, greatly raising public awareness of women's rights and motivating many to challenge the status quo. People who previously paid little attention to these issues are now more engaged with human rights, indicating a shift in public consciousness that promises deeper effects over time.
Golroo points out that, over the past two years, Iranian women have persisted in their resistance through social media and civil actions. While the movement hasn't yet led to immediate changes in government policy, it has intensified societal pressure and brought the issue of discrimination to the forefront of public debate.
Strikes and rallies planned inside Iran and abroad
On the eve of the second anniversary of the nationwide uprising, the Kurdistan Committee of the Worker-Communist Party of Iran issued a call for a nationwide strike on Sunday, September 15.
In a similar vein, nine labor and civil organizations within Iran issued a joint statement on the second anniversary of the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement, underscoring that "the inevitable confrontation between the majority of the people and the government has been ongoing for years due to worsening living conditions." The statement went on to declare, "We know there is no choice but to continue the 'Women, Life, Freedom' revolution."
Iranians abroad are also set to gather at various locations worldwide in the coming days to honor the memory of those killed by state security forces during the Mahsa movement.
Shirin Shams, a representative of the Women’s Revolution Organization, told Iran International, "Despite employing organized repression, the Islamic Republic cannot stop the progress of the 'Women, Life, Freedom' revolution." She further highlighted that over the past two years, women, students, schoolchildren, workers, teachers, nurses, retirees, LGBTQ+ individuals, and the broader public in Iran have united in their continued struggle against the Islamic Republic.
On September 11, Amnesty International released a report on the second anniversary of the "Women, Life, Freedom" uprising, emphasizing that officials of the Islamic Republic and those responsible for crimes against the people have systematically escaped punishment.
Diana Eltahawy, a senior official at Amnesty International, called for other countries to launch criminal investigations into the Iranian government's actions during the 2022 protests.
In March 2024, the UN Fact-Finding Committee, in its first report on the Mahsa movement, concluded that the violent crackdown on these protests and the widespread, systemic discrimination against women and girls had led to severe human rights violations in Iran, with many acts of repression constituting "crimes against humanity."
Tom Sharpe, worked alongside the Americans in the Red Sea for two decades, witnessing their might as the most powerful navy in the world.
Despite that image and legacy, the Houthis have not been deterred by the US defensive and allied naval actions, he believes.
The Americans, and by extension the ‘West’, are failing to the Iran-backed rebels from the mountains of Yemen, he concluded.
The retired navy commander revealed on the Eye for Iran podcast that Tehran is winning against the US in the Red Sea.
“They're achieving their ends, all of them, and we're achieving none of ours. We're spending millions and millions of dollars on not winning. It's a real problem.”
Just after Oct 7, the Houthis have been attacking maritime shipping, disrupting shipping trade through the crucial Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
The Iran-backed rebel group say they are conducting the attacks in solidarity with the people of Gaza to push for a ceasefire, but Sharpe said they have only convinced a few.
According to the Joint Maritime Information Centre, the Houthis have attacked nearly 100 vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden since Israel's war against Hamas began after the atrocities of Oct 7.
The rebel group released footage in August of their fighters on the Greek-flagged oil tanker Sounion, detonating explosives on the ship. That prompted concerns of an environmental disaster.
In early September, the US military said the Houthis attacked two crude oil tankers – the Saudi- flagged Amjad, carrying about two million barrels of oil, and the Panama- flagged Blue Lagoon in the Red Sea. The Houthis claimed responsibility for targeting the Blue Lagoon with missiles and drones.
For Sharpe, the way the US is responding to the Houthis is “unusual” given how the US Navy had been operating and their procedures over the years.
“When the USS Mason was fired at in 2017 in the same area, they shot T -Lam Tomahawks straight back almost immediately. This whole thing has been backward leaning for all sorts of political reasons, but it’s just engendered this idea that the Houthis can keep going.”
Why is it that the most powerful navy in the world cannot beat a rebel group from the mountains?
Sharpe said to “hit them hard enough to make them stop would be really difficult” and the reason is “they’ve learned so much from Iran in terms of mass maneuverability.”
The bedrock of Iran’s strategy, he said, is concealment and agility in the Persian Gulf. Sharp added, if you go after one target, which costs in the millions, the Houthis are skilled at hiding their weapons, and move it around on mobile launchers, hiding it in the mountains and villages.
The Americans would need a tremendous amount of airborne surveillance to achieve anything and that comes with huge costs with one missile used to strike a drone, amounting to around 6 million US dollars, according to Sharpe.
Another reason for a weak response from the Americans would be not to anger Iran and set off the balance of deterrence in the Middle East.
On Ward Carroll's YouTube episode, titled 'Admiral Tells the Real Truth about battling the Houthis in the Red Sea," a US Navy commander from the Dwight D Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group, said he suggested more aggressive strikes on the Houthis, but he was told not to by higher command to reportedly avoid angering Iran.
Gen. Michael Kurilla, CENTCOM's commander claimed in a letter to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin that the current policies are "failing" to have the desired impact on Houthi attacks, according to an exclusive published in the Wall Street Journal.
On Eye for Iran, Sharpe also revealed that the Houthis are likely exporters of weapons, saying that they learned to reverse engineer from the Islamic Republic.
"They've become so good at this; they may well be sending it back to Iran."
For more, you can watch the full episode on YouTube or listen on Spotify, Castbox, Apple, or Amazon.
September 11 is far from forgotten, but its aftermath is often viewed through the lens of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. What is frequently overlooked is how these costly and traumatic conflicts, and the geopolitical shifts they triggered, have shaped the current regional dynamics. Today’s complex Middle East quagmire, heavily influenced by Iran’s growing support for various actors, can be traced back to the ripple effects of those wars and the changes they imposed on the region’s power structure.
As hijacked airliners struck New York’s twin towers and the Pentagon, killing thousands, Americans united with a strength not seen since World War II. The global community rallied behind the United States, even supporting its swift invasion of Afghanistan to root out the terrorists responsible for the attacks. This unprecedented unity reflected the world’s collective resolve in confronting the threat of terrorism in the immediate aftermath of September 11.
But the ill-planned 2003 invasion of Iraq opened the floodgates to an Iranian expansion few could have imagined on September 10, 2001, when Saddam Hussein still controlled Iraq, practically begging Washington to be left alone and promising to behave. Disregarding the looming dangers of unintended consequences, the Bush administration relentlessly shoveled coal into the furnace of a reckless train, charging toward disaster in the region.
The Iraqi invasion badly damaged the US image among the Arabs, especially that the original excuse for the war, the alleged existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction proved false. This fueled a chain of events that allowed Iran to step into the power vacuum left by Saddam, reshaping the Middle East in ways no one foresaw. Meanwhile, the unending war in Afghanistan also sapped resources and focus, perhaps diverting attention from Iran's regional plans, while two simultaneous wars undoubtedly did not help the United States.
A few months after the invasion, signs began to emerge that Iran’s Islamic regime was beginning to build influence among Shiites in Iraq and even assisting the growing Sunni insurgency against the United States.
As the Taliban once famously said, “You may have the watches, but we have the time,” the Iranians began experimenting with a model of proxy warfare that today has brought the region to a new phase of instability, war and the partial closure of the Red Sea to a significant portion of world shipping.
As the US withdrew its forces from Iraq in 2009, Iran found a wide-open playing field in the country, exerting influence in local politics and becoming a king maker in the fragile and unstable democratic system in Iraq.
The more the region experienced tremors, the more Tehran capitalized on them to expand its influence, forming a Shiite crescent that now stretches to the Mediterranean. The first significant tremor came with the Arab Spring, followed by the outbreak of popular protests against Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Tehran quickly stepped in, pledging military support to Assad in suppressing the growing rebellion, largely driven by the Sunni majority. By 2011, Iran was fully committed to the Syrian conflict, sending its Revolutionary Guard as "advisors" and organizing Iraqi, Afghan, and other forces to serve as foot soldiers in the brutal civil war. From 2011 to 2014, Iran’s involvement deepened, establishing a crucial foothold in Syria’s devastating conflict, all in an effort to safeguard Assad’s regime and expand its regional influence.
Meanwhile, the United States focused on diplomacy and sanctions aimed at curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions and fought ISIS in Iraq, without responding decisively to developments in Syria. Russia capitalized on the situation, deploying its forces to support Iranian efforts to crush the Syrian rebels. By the time former President Donald Trump partially reversed U.S. policy and took a tougher stance on Tehran, Syria was largely pacified, solidifying Iran’s Shiite crescent of influence extending to the Mediterranean.
During a brief period, following Trump’s “maximum pressure” sanctions and the January 2020 killing of Qasem Soleimani, Tehran's threat appeared to diminish. However, the situation shifted when President Joe Biden initiated new nuclear talks. Although these efforts ultimately proved futile, the US had already relaxed sanctions, allowing Iran to export nearly 1.5 million barrels of oil per day to China. Additionally, just before Hamas's October 7 attack on Israel, Washington unfroze around $16 billion in Iranian assets, further loosening financial constraints on Tehran.
This has sparked criticism that the Biden administration indirectly enabled Iran’s support for the October 7 attack. While there may be some truth to this, one could argue that the roots of the October 7 incident trace back to earlier events—9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These pivotal moments set the stage for the ongoing instability in the Middle East, with Iran gradually expanding its influence over the years.
