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The event convened mere hours after Ismail Haniyeh's assassination in Tehran on Wednesday, centered on a 2014 US book that was only recently translated into Farsi and now brought to the forefront.

The discussion featured figures closely associated with Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former foreign minister and the current Deputy for Strategic Affairs to the new President, Masoud Pezeshkian.

The session, hosted by the news outlet Khabar Online, focused on identifying the obstacles to an improved Iran-US relationship. The discussion effectively challenged the idea that the establishment is inherently opposed to America, seemingly downplaying the Supreme Leader’s staunch anti-American stance and the "Death to the US" chants that echoed through the parliament during Pezeshkian’s inauguration the previous day.

“Tracing the Iran-US relationship from its inception, one observes that disruptions have consistently arisen due to third-party interference, historically by the Russians and the British and currently by Israel,” said Sassan Karimi, the session's host and an academic who conducted his postdoctoral research under Zarif's supervision at Tehran University.

The host further remarked that the most recent of these obstructive acts was Israel's assassination of Haniyeh in Iran, a maneuver aimed at derailing potential Iran-US relations.

“Whenever [Israel] senses that a de-escalation of tensions might occur [between the US and Iran], it resorts to such reckless behaviors,” he added.

One of the speakers, Diako Hosseini, Deputy of Economic Studies at the Chamber of Commerce, went as far as to challenge the reliance on China and Russia, identifying it as the principal impediment to fostering relations with the US.

“At the time of the Islamic Revolution, approximately 60% of America's oil was sourced from the Persian Gulf. Today, that figure has diminished to about 8%, with China now occupying that strategic position,” Hosseini said. The expert should have also noted that US oil production had substantially declined in the 1970s and China was not yet an industrial country. Now, US is an oil exporter.

He pointed out that today, Iran's nuclear issue is not the top priority for the US. "The main issue for the US, whether Democrats or Republicans, is China," he stated. "The challenge lies in Iran's alignment with the Russia-China camp, which poses a fundamental challenge for the US," he added.

Hosseini went on to voice a controversial opinion. "We must consider that even if we were to completely shut down Iran's nuclear program and hand them over to the US, American sanctions against Iran would still not be lifted."

Last week, Hosseini had remarked that 60% of Iran's imports originate from just two countries, China and the UAE, describing this as a significant national security threat.

The book that served as the focal point of the session, "US-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue," is a collaborative work by a former deputy foreign minister of Iran, an academic at Sharif University, and the former executive director of the MIT Center for International Studies, US.

The invited speakers at the panel included Majid Takht-Ravanchi, former Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations during President Hasan Rouhani, Mohammad Kazem Sajjadpour former Advisor to the Minister Foreign Affairs on Strategic Issues appointed by Zarif and former Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative for the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations.

Another familiar face was Hossein Mousavian, who joined the panel as a speaker online. He is a Middle East Security and Nuclear Policy Specialist at Princeton University, and Tehran's ambassador to Germany from 1990 to 1997. Activists accuse him of involvement in the assassinations of at least 24 Iranian dissidents in Europe during the 1990s, leading to calls for his ouster from Princeton last year.

Political commentator Majid Mohammadi asserts that Zarif's trust in Mousavian, shown by his European representation during Zarif's tenure at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, highlights Mousavian's commitment to the establishment. Mohammadi, who conducted post-doctoral work at Princeton in 2007-2008, stated that during his time at Tehran's Resalat Daily in the late 1980s, Mousavian played a crucial role in legitimizing and promoting terrorism.

Hosseinian, who contributed a chapter to the book, emphasized during the meeting that including a section on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's views was crucial.

"Since the Supreme Leader is the main decision-maker regarding Iran-US relations, Americans must properly understand his ideas," he said.

It seems that Zarif, the architect of Iran's 2015 nuclear deal, has already mobilized efforts to coordinate and amplify narratives aimed at engaging the US in familiar negotiation tactics, particularly with Democratic Party politicians. He has established a robust network abroad specifically for this purpose.

An investigative report by Iran International and Semafor in 2023 uncovered that during Zarif’s tenure as Foreign Minister, the Islamic Republic established the Iran Experts Initiative in the United States in the mid-2010s, with the aim of influencing American policy centers and the US government. This operation was orchestrated and overseen by officials under Zarif's direction.

A cadre of experts was enlisted to author articles and opinion pieces defending Tehran's stance on key issues, including Iran's nuclear program and sanctions.

But the crucial matter is, as Hosseinian admitted, Khamenei is the ultimate decision-maker. Critics of the Islamic government content that Khamenei strategically using Zarif as a chess piece to navigate Iran out of its dire economic straits.

In a statement released on Saturday, the IRGC said the attack originated from outside the immediate area where Haniyeh was staying.

“This action was designed and implemented by the Zionist regime and supported by the criminal government of America,” the IRGC statement added.

After three days, this marks the first time the IRGC has publicly disclosed the exact cause of Ismail Haniyeh's death, who had traveled to Iran for the inauguration of President Masoud Pezehskian.

During this time, speculations abounded whether a long-range missile was fired from outside Iran's borders, or launched from an aircraft over Iranian airspace.

The IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency had previously released a photo of the damaged residence, stating that Haniyeh was killed while staying on the fourth floor of a building in Zafaraniyeh in northern Tehran.

Iranian media, including the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, previously reported, quoting Khaled Qaddoumi, Hamas' representative in Tehran, that Haniyeh's death was caused by a missile or rocket fired from outside the building toward the room where he was staying.

This contradicts reports by The New York Times and Telegraph, which claimed that the attack was carried out by planting a bomb in Haniyeh's room.

The Telegraph reported that Israel’s intelligence agency, Mossad, hired Iranian security agents to plant explosives in three separate rooms of a building where a Hamas leader was staying.

The original plan was to assassinate Ismail Haniyeh, the political head of the Palestinian militant group, in May during the funeral of former Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi, according to the report. However, the operation was aborted due to the many people inside the building and the high possibility of failure.

New York Times also, citing five Middle Eastern officials had stated that a bomb was hidden in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-run guesthouse in the Neshat compound in northern Tehran.

The newspaper detailed that the explosion, which occurred around 2 am local time, was triggered remotely and caused significant damage. It shook the building, shattered windows, and partially collapsed an exterior wall.

Regardless of the method employed, it is evident that even Iranian officials acknowledge a significant failure on Iran's part to protect Haniyeh, highlighting a profound lapse in security measures.

According to three Iranian officials speaking to The New York Times, this breach represents "a catastrophic failure of intelligence and security for Iran and a tremendous embarrassment for the Guards, who use the compound for retreats, secret meetings, and housing prominent guests like Mr. Haniyeh."

As Iran’s gas demand is expected to soar to two billion cubic meters per day over the next 15 years, Manouchehr Daftarian, head of the Iranian Gas Engineering Association, has urged the Supreme National Security Council to address the current gas imbalance. He warns that if this issue is not resolved promptly, the country will face severe and unmanageable challenges.

During the summer, Iran faces a 14,000-megawatt (MW) electricity shortage, while in the winter, it struggles with a daily gas deficit of 250 million cubic meters (Mcm/d). These shortages cost the country's industries at least $8 billion annually.

While Iran ranks second after Russia in terms of gas reserves, holding 34 trillion cubic meters, it has not developed new fields. Additionally, its largest gas-producing field, South Pars, has experienced a pressure drop and a decline in productivity.

Iran's annual gas demand has risen from 153 bcm in 2013 to 245 bcm in 2023, reflecting a 7% annual increase over the past decade. The residential sector and power plants have driven much of this growth and are expected to continue showing strong consumption increases through 2040.

Due to the lack of growth in renewable energy, the extent of electricity and gas shortages in Iran has spread to all seasons in recent years. The peak of the electricity imbalance, however, occurs in the summer, while the peak of the gas shortage happens in the winter.

Daftarian has also warned that unless gas consumption is halved, the imbalance will not be resolved in the coming years.

“This winter, there is currently a gas imbalance of about 250 mcm/d. The issue is that our problem is not just now. In 2027, even with enhanced energy consumption, the gas demand will be 1,500 mcm/d, but the government will only be able to supply 400 mcm/d,” he recently said.

In January, the National Development Fund (NDF) of Iran also predicted that by 2040, the country's gas production would only be able to meet "one-third" of domestic demand.

According to its estimates, domestic gas demand in Iran will nearly double by 2040, reaching over 1.4 bcm/d, while production levels are expected to almost halve, dropping below 493 mcm/d. Additionally, the NDF projects that the greatest growth in gas demand will occur in the residential and power generation sectors.

The Research Center of the Iranian Parliament published a similar report last summer, indicating that in addition to the 250 mcm/d gas shortage in winter, there are shortages in other seasons as well. Overall, the average gas imbalance throughout the year is about 123 mcm/d, and it is projected to peak at 460 mcm/d by 2040.

Why is Iran's gas production declining?

About three-fourths of Iran’s gas is produced from the South Pars field, which is shared with Qatar. According to Iran's Ministry of Petroleum, this field has entered its second half-life since last year, and with the ongoing pressure drop, gas production from South Pars will decrease by 10 bcm per year starting this year.

This decline will significantly impact Iran's overall gas production and contribute to the growing energy shortage in the country.

In contrast, Qatar began gas production from this shared field 10 years earlier than Iran and has already produced 2.8 trillion cubic meters of commercial gas (pure methane) from it.

Iran claims to have produced two trillion cubic meters of "raw" gas from South Pars so far, although it is not precisely clear how much of this produced gas is pure methane and how much consists of other impurities such as water and heavy gasses.

Years ago, Qatar addressed the pressure drop issue in this field by installing 20,000-ton platforms, which are 15 times larger than those on the Iranian side of South Pars, and are capable of carrying massive compressors. Since 2022, Qatar has signed a $29 billion contract with global oil giants, aiming to increase gas production from this field by 35% within the next three years and by approximately 60% by 2030.

Following the JCPOA, known as the Iran nuclear deal, Tehran signed a $5 billion contract with a consortium led by French company Total for the development of Phase 11 of South Pars. Half of the contract amount was allocated for constructing a 20,000-ton platform equipped with two massive compressors.

After the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Total pulled out of the project, and the Chinese partner, CNPC, also abandoned it shortly thereafter. The technology for constructing these facilities is exclusively held by a few Western companies.

South Pars accounts for over 40% of Iran’s gas reserves, and while the Islamic Republic could somewhat increase its gas production by developing new fields, the investment in the upstream oil and gas sector has been insufficient. Over the past few years, the average annual investment in this sector in Iran has only been $3 billion, which is half of what it was in the early years of the previous decade and one-seventh of the 2000s.

Additionally, 80% of Iran’s active oil fields are in their second half-life and lose 8 to 12% of their production annually. The government's current focus is on developing new oil fields to prevent a decline in crude oil production and exports, leaving gas projects as a lower priority.

According to the World Bank, Iran flared 20.4 billion cubic meters of gas last year. The International Energy Agency estimates methane leakage from gas facilities in Iran at 8 billion cubic meters annually.

In the grand scheme of things, Iran would need just around $5 billion to stop flaring and a few billion more to halt methane leaks. The government, however, has not deemed this a priority amidst the country’s financial crisis and budget deficit.

During a live broadcast on Tehran's possible response on Friday night, an Iranian state TV anchor declared, "In the coming hours, the world will witness extraordinary scenes and significant developments."

Nour News, a media outlet close to Iran's Supreme National Security Council, posted on its X social media account near midnight on Friday, using the hashtags #RevengeForGuest and #IsmailHaniyeh: "A punitive operation against the Israeli regime will be carried out at a determined time and manner."

The X account of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has pinned a tweet that says, "The fall of the Zionist regime [Israel] is inevitable."

This type of psychological warfare, prevalent in Iranian media since Haniyeh's death, suggests there would be a significant response to the killing of Ismail Haniyeh on Wednesday in Tehran, as well as the killing of Tehran-backed Hezbollah's senior military commander, Fuad Shukr in an Israeli airstrike on a Beirut suburb a day earlier.

Despite the absence of comprehensive or transparent reports from Iranian domestic media and official sources regarding the circumstances of Ismail Haniyeh's death, there is a concerted effort to vociferously proclaim imminent retribution, asserting that an Iranian assault on Israel is inevitable within the coming hours and days.

The Iranian media, engaging in strategic ambiguity regarding the timing, emphasizes that the forthcoming action will surpass the previous offensive in scale and impact.

On April 13, Iran initiated a significant offensive, launching a barrage of over 300 missiles and drones at Israel, citing retaliation for Israel's purportedly lethal strike on its embassy compound in Damascus on April 1.

While almost all these projectiles were intercepted and neutralized, hardline factions assert that this forthcoming assault will be markedly more severe.

On Saturday, Kayhan, the most hardline newspaper in Tehran, stated, "Iran has advanced significantly over the past five months, and the retribution against the Zionists will be more multifaceted, coordinated, and severe this time."

The paper, funded by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, reported that unlike Iran's April operation against Israel, which targeted only a few bases outside Israeli cities, the upcoming operation would target areas deep inside Israel, such as Tel Aviv and Haifa, strategic centers, and the residences of Israeli officials involved in killing Haniyeh. This assertion was made in Kayhan's Saturday editorial, managed by Khamenei's representative.

In Tehran's imminent retaliatory operation against Israel, the article added, long-range and precision missiles and drones will be among the options. However, unlike the April attack on Israel, the possibilities will likely not be limited to two or three types of missiles and drones launched from miles away and only from Iran.

Kayhan emphasized that in the upcoming operation, the Islamic Republic's military should consider "painful human casualties" in addition to causing strategic damage. According to Kayhan, Israeli ships traveling from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea will also be targeted with heavy attacks, presumably bu Iran's Houthi proxies in Yemen, and Israel's economic targets will not be immune to military strikes.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon announced on Friday that the US military will deploy additional fighter jets and Navy warships to the Middle East. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has approved the deployment of additional Navy cruisers and destroyers, capable of intercepting ballistic missiles, to both the Middle East and Europe. Furthermore, an additional squadron of fighter jets will be dispatched to the Middle East.

The Pentagon indicated plans to enhance readiness for deploying more land-based ballistic missile defenses. This strategic move follows intensified US military deployments before Iran's April 13 attack on Israeli territory.

Analysts, however, caution that if Hezbollah joins forces with Iran, it could complicate interception efforts. The threat from Hezbollah in Lebanon, with its extensive arsenal and proximity to Israel, presents unique challenges for US efforts to intercept drones and missiles.

What is the capacity of this newly created position? What is Zarif's agenda in this context, and what goals will he pursue? Based on what has been said and published in Iran so far, Zarif's most likely role will be to lead influence campaigns in the West.

Deputy, adviser, or head of a study center?
The text of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s appointment letter draws multiple roles for Zarif. As the President’s deputy, Zarif will hold a portfolio equivalent to those overseeing executive, parliamentary, legal, and Sunni affairs, or similar to positions like the heads of the Atomic Energy Organization, the Management and Planning Organization, or the Environmental Protection Organization. While these organizations are not ministries, they function at a comparable level.
At the same time, Zarif is expected to advise the head of the executive branch on strategic matters. His role includes: "Leveraging the accumulated experience of the country's senior managers over the past decades and the extensive expertise of elites from think tanks and civil society institutions.” The president also noted that Zarif is “expected to monitor major domestic and international developments, assess the success in achieving the goals of the constitution, the vision document, and the general policies approved by the Supreme Leader, and report directly to me." Zarif himself acknowledges this advisory role.
Another role assigned to Zarif is to preside over a research institute. According to Pezeshkian’s letter, Zarif is tasked with "taking over the responsibility of the Presidential Strategic Research Center and transforming its missions and functions into a suitable organization for the President’s deputyship." The Presidential Strategic Research Center, part of the Iranian Presidential Institution, serves as a think tank for the administration, conducting strategic and inter-institutional studies, reviews, and research. It is responsible for introducing plans and proposals related to national strategies in political, economic, social, and cultural fields, in line with the general policies of the system.

This strategic deputy position was specifically created for Mohammad Javad Zarif, as it did not previously exist within the organizational structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Zarif's agenda
Zarif has clearly outlined the mission of this new deputy position: "No new bureaucracy or mechanisms will be created, there will be no burden on the government's budget or the people's table; no interference with existing operations; no diminishing the functions of any organization; and the role will serve as a bridge between the government, the people, think tanks, and civil institutions."

Zarif will not establish new organizations and will have an office within the presidential building. He will continue the role he played during Pezeshkian’s campaign and in the appointment of ministers: mobilizing and promoting Pezeshkian’s agenda. His job is to help the president navigate among existing power structures; a role similar to what he held as foreign minister. Additionally, in situations where the president is sidelined, Zarif will find ways to maneuver between political, security, and military forces, as he did when dealing with the notorious Qasem Soleimani, the IRGC, and the Supreme Leader’s office, to avoid becoming irrelevant.

The idea of connecting the government with the people and civil institutions seems far-fetched, as Zarif operates within the hardcore of power and has never engaged with independent civil society institutions in Iran.

Zarif's capabilities
Zarif lacks significant influence within the country, aside from a few experts at the Institute for Political and International Studies, an entity affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the senior staff of the Ministry. His real strength lies in the network he has cultivated abroad. During his decade-long stay in New York as Iran's representative at the United Nations and his 8 years as Foreign Minister, Zarif developed an extensive network of foreign contacts that Pezeshkian needs. Despite opposition from some in the parliament and the IRGC, Pezeshkian must bear the cost of maintaining Zarif's cooperation.
Zarif is a valuable partner for cooperation, often praised by a network of Iranian and non-Iranian forces in the media, think tanks, and foreign ministries in Western countries. He can shape narratives and provide analysis that aligns with the goals of Pezeshkian or the Leader’s office during critical periods. Holding a government position also shields him from suspicions of unauthorized cooperation with foreign governments, a serious legal charge in Iran. Over his eight years as Foreign Minister, Zarif demonstrated a high capacity for disinformation, outright lies, and propaganda aimed at influencing public opinion in the West.

An investigative report by Iran International and Semafor in 2023, revealed that during Zarif’s tenure as foreign minister, the Islamic Republic was able to create the Iran Experts Initiative in the United States in mid-2010s, to influence American policy centers and the US government. The operation was led and coordinated by officials working for Zarif.

A group of experts were tasked to write articles and opinion pieces, for example, that aimed to defend Tehran’s position on major issues, such as Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions.

In a recent example, after the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31, individuals known for defending pro-Tehran positions in the West framed his assassination as a setback to the peace process and the pursuit of a ceasefire. This narrative, which aligns with the views of the Biden administration and some European countries, is used by the Islamic Republic of Iran to portray Israel as the aggressor. Zarif can focus on coordinating and amplifying these types of influence activities.