The European Union's decision to send a representative to the swearing-in ceremony of Iran's new President, Masoud Pezeshkian, has sparked outrage among several members of the European Parliament and human rights activists.
In a letter to Josep Borrell, the EU's foreign affairs chief, Polish MEP Adam Bielan from the European Conservatives and Reformists group, lambasted the decision as "not appropriate."
He argued that the EU's presence at the event would inadvertently "legitimize the Iranian regime", currently sanctioned for human rights abuses, its nuclear program and support of Russia's war on Ukraine.
"This decision is not only misguided but stands in direct contradiction to the values and principles that the European Union purports to uphold," Bielan stated.
He further condemned Iran’s ongoing support for terrorist activities, which poses a "direct threat to global security", including Iran's Houthi militia's blockade of commercial shipping in the Red Sea region. Last year, the US declared Iran the world's number one state sponsor of terror.
The letter, signed by several MEPs, also stressed that Iran's involvement in regional conflicts and its record on human rights are fundamentally at odds with the EU's commitment to promoting democracy and human rights globally.
"Engaging diplomatically with such a regime at this juncture is highly inappropriate and dangerous. It undermines the integrity of our foreign policy and sends a message of tacit approval to a government that flagrantly violates human rights and international norms," Bielan added.
While Josep Borrell said he would not personally attend the ceremony, citing the lowest point in EU-Iran relations, his deputy, Enrique Mora, would represent the EU. He was alongside officials from countries including the United Arab Emirates and China.
Mora, who serves as the deputy secretary-general of the European External Action Service (EEAS), was tasked with representing the EU at what officials have insisted is merely a "diplomatic level," not a political endorsement.
However, this distinction has done little to quell the anger. Dutch MEP Bart Groothuis of the Liberal Renew group called the EU's participation "unacceptable."
German Green MEP Hannah Neumann expressed frustration on social media, referencing Josep Borrell's impending departure as EU foreign affairs chief and suggesting a shift in policy under incoming Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, known for her tougher stance on Iran.
The ceremony was largely boycotted by global powers. Among the most senior to attend was UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
Most of the ceremony's other foreign guests represented neighboring countries and a few allies from Africa and Latin America. Even Iran's largest consumer of oil and geopolitical ally China, sent a low level delegation.
Iran has continued to garner criticism as a wave of executions last year saw the government order more than 850 in a record high. Additionally, rights activists cite the ongoing imprisonment of dissidents and oppression of minorities as contrary to EU principles.
The European Union also announced on Tuesday that despite removing some names and Iranian institutions, it will maintain the bulk of its targeted sanctions and anti-terrorism measures against entities, organizations, and individuals affiliated with the Islamic Republic.
In the latest update, the name of Brigadier General Mohammad Naderi has been removed from the list.
Ali Mohammad Naderi, head of the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) under the Ministry of Defense, was identified by the European Union in the summer of 2007 as an individual connected to sensitive nuclear activities and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran and was placed on the EU sanctions list.
Anis Naccache, a Lebanese national who was implicated in the failed assassination attempt on Shapour Bakhtiar, the last Prime Minister of Iran under the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, has also been removed from this list. He passed away due to COVID-19 in Syria in the winter of 2021. Naccache was also involved in the attack on the OPEC headquarters and the hostage-taking of OPEC oil ministers in 1975.
The companies Marou Sanat, Samen Industries, Surena, and Faryand Technique have also been removed from the European sanctions list.
Marou Sanat was first placed on the sanctions lists of the US Treasury Department and the European Union in the winter of 2014 for attempting to procure equipment for the Arak heavy water production plant and the IR-40 heavy water reactor, including zirconium silicate.
Samen Industries, a metallurgy company, has been under US, UN, and EU sanctions since 2011.
Faryand Electric was placed on the EU sanctions list in the summer of 2007 in connection with Iran's nuclear activities and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Surena, another company removed from the sanctions list, has been on the European sanctions list since the winter of 2011. Surena is a nuclear contractor involved in the construction of nuclear facilities and is active in the Darkhovin Nuclear Power Plant, south of Iran.
On July 15, the European Union extended the sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic for military support to Russia in the Ukraine war and the Houthi militants in Yemen for another year. The sanctions target nine entities and 12 officials of the Islamic Republic.
On May 31, the EU also imposed new sanctions against several Iranian officials, including Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, the Minister of Defense, Esmail Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Afshin Khajehfard, the Deputy Minister of Defense.
In the second round, Pezeshkian’s campaign depicted his hardline rival as an existential threat to the livelihood of the nation. More people turned out for the run-off and Pezeshkian defeated the ultra-conservative Saeed Jalili. But he lost to those who boycotted the election. In the end, many more stayed at home than voted for the ‘reformist’ candidate.
So, the question is: how did Pezeshkian win despite failing to persuade the majority that he could deliver the reforms he promised? The answer, I argue in this piece, is the ethnic vote. (All data featured in this piece comes from official sources, and there are reasons to doubt their veracity. But that would be the subject for another article).
Ethnically, Iran is a highly diverse society. While the official language is Persian, millions of people have different mother tongues, such as Azari, Kurdish, Baluchi, and Arabic. These minorities often lack representation, particularly many Kurds and almost all Baluchis who are Sunnis, whereas most other groups, including the Arabic and Azeri speakers, are Shia.
Pezeshkian seems to come from a Azeri-speaking family, but he was born and raised among Kurds. Most minorities, ethnic and religious, picked him over Jalili, especially the Baluchis and the Kurds. But the focus here is on the Azari-speaking voters. (Note that most Turkish-speaking Iranians are Shia, which helps us single out the ethnic element.)
The figure below illustrates the role of the Azari speakers in Pezeshkian's victory. The horizontal axis represents the ratio of Azari speakers in each province. Azari belongs to the family of Turkic languages, which is also heavily influenced by Persian. Within Iran, people usually call it “Torki”, which means Turkish. The vertical axis represents the vote shares in the run-off, as a percentage of eligible voters in each province.
To better understand what seems to be a strong ethnic factor, we can consult the chart below, which shows the Azari or Turkish speaking population in each province.
Pezeshkian secured the highest share of vote in such provinces as East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Zanjan and Ardabil, where the majority are Azari (Turkish) speakers. In contrast, Jalili had an overall advantage in provinces with the lowest Azari-speaking populations. This does not mean that Jalili is popular among Persian-speaking Iranians. It seems to suggest that he did better than Pezeshkian in provinces with minimal ethnic minority presence.
The quantitative index of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) is illuminating in this regard. The PCC index indicates the strength of the linear relationship and dependency between two variables. In the following diagram, each candidate’s vote share (in each province) is the dependent variable, and the relative size of the Turkish-speaking population (in that province) is the independent variable.
The correlation coefficient for Pezeshkian is 0.7 (70%), while for Jalili it is -0.47 ( -47). A positive value indicates that an increase in the independent variable leads to an increase in the dependent variable, whereas a negative value suggests that an increase in one variable results in a decrease in the other. The linear relationship for Pezeshkian's votes is strong and positive, suggesting that his share of vote (in most cases) rises as the Azari speaking population in a province increases. In contrast, the relationship for Jalili is weak and negative. (Same for Kurdish, Baloch, and Turkmen speakers).
One counterargument could be that the data should be interpreted differently: that the Persian-speaking population didn’t like Pezeshkian and voted for Jalili. But the low turnout in such provinces seem to refute this hypothesis. Moreover, in most of these provinces, Pezeshkian gained more in vote share as the turnout rose in the run-off.
To underline the crucial role of the Azari (Turkish) speaking Iranians in the second round of the election, we can compare the results with that of the 2017 presidential election –where Hassan Rouhani tried to attract the ethnic vote.
As seen above, Rouhani’s vote is more homogeneous across provinces, and the ‘Azari variable’ is less pronounced. Rouhani did receive more votes in provinces with majority Azari-speaking populations. But he also did so in the non-ethnic regions (except for Zanjan, where Raisi had more votes.)
The Pearson correlation coefficient for Rouhani is 5%, while for Raisi it is -10%. This indicates that the strength of the linear relationship between the two variables is much weaker. Azari speaking Iranians didn’t like Raisi, but their preference had much less impact on the final result that it did in 2024. It was insignificant statistically.
In the 2024 run-off, if we look at the Azari speaking provinces only, Pezeshkian got 2.8 million more votes than Jalili. That’s almost a million more than their vote difference in the first round. However, if we look at the six provinces where Persian is predominant, Jalili got about 830,000 more votes than Pezeshkian. In the first round, that number was about 275,000. In other words, the increase in the vote margin between Pezeshkian and Jalili in the second round is 3.7 times greater than the change observed in the six other provinces. Jalili’s advantage in Isfahan can be attributed to the low turnout (less than 50%). In Yazd, and Kerman, where official turnout in the run-off was above 50%, the changes may suggest a dramatic decline in the social standing of the reformists. In Khorasan Razavi, Jalili’s success may be due to local connections (he was born there). His lead (551,000 votes) is notably large and unexpected. In 2017, the picture was markedly different. Rouhani's advantage over Raisi in the six provinces mentioned above was 2.2 times greater than that of the four provinces with Azari speaking majorities.
Pezeshkian’s campaign may depict his presidency as a ‘reformist’ triumph. Previous ‘reform’ moments (1997, 2001, 2013, and 2017) were marked by national fervor and high turnout, neither of which transpired in 2024. Pezeshkian may name a few ‘reformists’ to his cabinet, and some may even call his administration a ‘reform government.’ The president himself acknowledges his indebtedness to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. However, the real story of Iran’s 2024 elections may very well be the ethnic vote.
The meetings came before the swearing-in ceremony of Iranian president-elect Masoud Pezeshkian, highlighting Iran's ongoing support for the proxy militias.
During a separate meeting, Pezeshkian also expressed strong support for Hamas amid its war in Gaza, telling the group's political head Ismail Haniyeh, "We are certain that the resistance of the Palestinian people and fighters will lead to ultimate victory and the liberation of the land of Palestine."
Tehran has openly admitted to providing financial, logistical and training support to Hamas, praising the group's attacks on Israel on October 7 which killed 1,200 mostly civilians, while denying involvement in the specific operations. Hamas is now considered one of Iran's armed militant proxies in the region, alongside Lebanese Hezbollah.
In 2022, Haniyeh disclosed in an interview with Al Jazeera that his group had received $70 million in military aid from Iran. He noted, "We have rockets that are locally manufactured, but the long-range rockets came from abroad, from Iran, Syria, and others through Egypt."
The US State Department has previously estimated that Tehran's support for Palestinian terror groups, including Hamas, amounts to approximately $100 million annually.
Additionally, Pezeshkian met with Mohammed Abdul-Salam, the spokesman for Yemen's Houthi Ansarullah movement. He praised the group's recent actions against Israel and maritime navigation, remarking, "Your actions have clearly put pressure on the Zionist regime and its supporters." Pezeshkian also emphasized the necessity of collaboration among Islamic countries, stating, "We must work with Islamic countries to end the oppression of Muslims."
The Iran-backed Houthis have significantly disrupted the Red Sea, launching missile and drone attacks on commercial vessels. They claim to be acting in support of Palestinians, asserting that their targets are exclusively ships associated with Israel or its primary allies, the US and Britain. However, multiple ships without connections to Israel have targeted with dozens of non-Israeli hostages taken since November.
For several years, the clerical rulers in Iran have been the primary supporter of the Houthis, providing funding, arms, and training amid Yemen's civil war. This support has enabled the group to gain and maintain control over large parts of Yemen, despite facing a much stronger military coalition led by Saudi Arabia.
Naim Qassem, the Shia Lebanese cleric and deputy leader of Hezbollah, is also in Tehran to meet with Iranian officials and attend the oath-taking ceremony.
Since its establishment in 1979, the government in Iran has consistently positioned itself as a strong adversary of Israel and the United States. In the early 1980s, it founded the Lebanese Hezbollah as a proxy force to challenge Israel.
Currently on the brink of war with Israel, Hezbollah has been acting in allegiance with Hamas since October 8, sending 6,400 projectiles towards Israel's northern border in the worst tensions since 2006. Over 200,000 Israeli and Lebanese civilians have been displaced.
Over the past twenty years, Iran has expanded its influence by creating proxy groups in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories. It also maintains networks in various other Middle Eastern, African, and Western nations.
Tehran provides Hezbollah, the largest and most powerful of its militias, with extensive financial aid estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars annually, in addition to advanced military equipment and training. Its missile arsenal is believed to be around 200,000. Hezbollah has been designated a terror group by countries including the US and UK.