As Harris launches her campaign, what is her stance on Iran?

The controversial cleric was little known to many ordinary Iranians before Jalili’s defeat in the elections. Since then, he and his views have come to be extensively condemned by opponents, or defended by followers who claim he is being ‘vilified’.

Mirbagheri is largely seen as the successor of the late Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi, the spiritual father of Iran's ultraconservatives, whom Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei held in very high esteem.

A mid-ranking cleric who has never held any government position, Mirbagheri has been a member of the Assembly of Experts since 2016. He also sits at the helm of the Academy of Islamic Sciences of Qom which defines its mission as the development and promotion of “Islamic sciences”.

As a member of the Assembly, Mirbagheri contends that the Assembly’s role must be “supporting” the Supreme Leader, not “supervising” him as the Constitution dictates. He has always strongly supported Khamenei as the absolute authority and the Supreme Islamic Jurist (Vali-ye Faghih).

Mirbagheri teaches that fighting “infidels” and overcoming them is a prerequisite for the “emergence” of the hidden Imam, Mahdi, who the Shiittes believe has been in occultation by divine for centuries.

Using an analogy with early Islamic history, Mirbagheri also argues that the legitimacy of the Islamic ruler does not depend on the votes of the people who may choose the authority of the wrong person. Critics say this is in contradiction with the views of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ruhollah Khomeini, who famously said that “people’s votes are the true measure.”

In a speech to commemorate the late President Ebrahim Raisi last week, Mirbagheri quoted Khomeini, as saying decades ago that the establishment of a “new culture based on Islam in the world” would entail “hardship, martyrdom, and hunger” and that Iranian people had “voluntarily chosen” to take that path.

“Our people are prepared to move towards [such] ideals,” he said in his speech in which he also accused those in favor of negotiation with the West of seeking to “integrate” Iran in the current world order and weaken it like Japan and Germany” by “accepting disarmament”.

Mirbagheri supported Jalili in the 2013 presidential elections and Ebrahim Raisi in 2017 against moderate Hassan Rouhani. He also supported the populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but turned his back on him when he fell from Khamenei’s favor in 2011.

Between these two elections, he did not present a politically active image but has become very vocal in the past eighteen months and active on social media.

Mirbagheri’s views about the “world order” are similar to those of Alexander Dugin, the Russian ultranationalist philosopher, who has regularly been invited to visit Iran in recent years and met with Mirbagheri and other hardliners in Qom, the bastion of ultra-hardliners.

Opponents highlight Mirbagheri’s extreme views about women’s education “in the Western style”, hijab, social freedoms, his refutation of “Western sciences” as well as his advocacy of the “clash of civilizations”.

An article Wednesday by Mehrdad Khadir, deputy editor of the reformist Ham Mihan newspaper, suggested that Jalili’ defeat has saved Iranians from the danger of domination of Mirbagheri’s extreme views.

Some hardliners who now present Mirbagheri as a danger to the foundations of the Islamic Republic’s political and religious establishment allege that his supporters have plans to pitch him as the country’s future Supreme Leader. They also warn that under his leadership religious fundamentalism and extreme anti-Western views will prevail in the Islamic Republic.

Some others allege that Mirbagheri’s vilification is another “Khamenei gambit” meant to make him and his son Mojtaba look “moderate” in comparison and to eliminate him as a leadership contender and rival to Mojtaba.

Supporters of Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf blamed Jalili and his political sponsors, the ultra-hardliner Paydari (Steadfastness) Party and the recently established Jebhe-ye Sobh-e Iran (MASAF), for the defeat of the ‘revolutionary front’ in the elections. They were among the first to condemn Mirbagheri and his views on social media post elections.

Paydari and MASAF members often reiterate Mirbagheri’s apocalyptic, anti-western political, and anti-modernity views in their speeches and propaganda. Members of both groups have taken over many top and sensitive positions in the government in the past few years and formed a very influential minority in the parliament.

Some activists, politicians, and social media users in Iran warn that the unprecedented rise of such sentiments could entail serious violence against migrants and turn into a major security problem.

Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, one of the six candidates in the recent snap presidential elections, promised in his campaign speeches and debates to build walls along Iran's borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan to stop the influx of migrants and to expel “all illegal immigrants”.

Pezeshkian, too, promised that his future government would block the borders to end the influx of migrants, register those who are already in Iran, and negotiate with European countries to either accept some of them as refugees or pay Iran for some of the costs for hosting them.

He argued that the West had to accept responsibility for its actions in Afghanistan which he said had caused millions of Afghans to seek refuge in Iran. “There is no reason the Iranian people must pay the costs of the wrong policies of others,” he said in a series of tweets before the elections.

Ultra-hardliner Saeed Jalili who lost the runoff vote to Pezeshkian, however, avoided taking a clear stance on the matter. Jalili’s supporters accuse Ghalibaf and his supporters of inciting “Afghan phobia”. There have been allegations that some Afghans played an active role in Jalili’s campaign and promoted him on social media.

Jalili and other ultra-hardliners largely support the policies of the late President Ebrahim Raisi’s government which was accused of supporting an “open borders” policy with a hidden agenda.

They often highlight the role of the Afghan Hazara Fatemiyoun Brigade which was organized and trained by the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) to fight in Syria. There have been allegations that they want to bolster Iran’s military by recruiting more young Shiite Hazara Afghans.

Some critics allege that authorities under Raisi actively encouraged the growth of the Afghan population with incentives such as subsidized energy and food to remedy Iran's problem of population decline.

Those who demand the “expulsion” of Afghans accuse the government of letting them benefit from billions of dollars in food, fuel, and other subsidies. The influx of perhaps more than six million Afghans in the past three years has pushed up housing costs by increasing demand in the market, and taking jobs from Iranians.

There have also been widespread but unsubstantiated rumors that migrants are spreading various infectious diseases among Iranians including a claim refuted by health officials that leprosy is spreading in Iran due to Afghan migration.

Anti-Afghan sentiments are hugely promoted in Persian language social media with several dedicated hashtags including “Expulsion of Afghans is a national demand”.

Campaigners for the expulsion of Afghans who have also launched an online petition often highlight crimes allegedly committed by migrants including murder, rape, and child abduction.

Some campaigners for the expulsion of Afghans who also oppose the clerical rule in Iran are accused of expressing racist and ultra-nationalistic views on social media.

There have also been reports of indiscriminate aggressive behavior towards Afghans, irrespective of their residence status. There are also some reports of signs of “No Afghan entry” being displayed by real-estate agents.

A recent video clip on social media shows a young woman in a Tehran subway forcing an elderly Afghan woman to give up her seat, sparking widespread debate online.

Iranian media report that the Afghan population has overtaken Iranians in some deprived areas in and around the capital and other major cities as well as some smaller cities and towns.

Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) banned Afghans from living in 16 provinces in April 2023.

Afghans first came to Iran as refugees in the early 1980s and later as economic migrants, but their numbers rarely rose above two million before the Taliban takeover of the government in Afghanistan in 2021. Around 780,000 have refugee status and are not considered illegals.

The 2016 census found the presence of over 1.5 million Afghans in Iran. Officials admit that the number of Afghans has hugely increased since then. There are unsubstantiated claims that there may be as many as 15 million Afghans in Iran now. 

The Ham-Mihan newspaper in Tehran has published a report, which underscores the lingering ambiguities and the lack of a "definitive or publishable" conclusion.

“The reports are still not convincing, and the ambiguities surrounding the president's helicopter crash are met with unanswered questions from the public, which likely keeps the case open,” Mohammad Saleh Noghrekar, a lawyer and jurist, told the daily.

On May 19, a helicopter crash in northwestern instantly killed all occupants, including Raisi and his foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. The president was returning from a visit to a dam project, with three helicopters carrying the official delegation. The two other choppers had a normal flight.

Initial investigations revealed that only 69 seconds elapsed between the last contact with the helicopter pilots and the crash, with no emergency status declared—a detail that raises more questions than it answers. It remains unclear what happened in those 69 seconds that prevented even an emergency status announcement.

The second report of the High Commission investigating the dimensions and causes of the helicopter crash noted that the weather forecast on May 19 indicated favorable weather conditions suitable for visual flight to the first and second destinations until 8:50 AM on the day of the incident. The newspaper report emphasized that the weather on the return route, based on the latest received documents and statements from the pilots and passengers of two other helicopters, requires further examination.

Adding to the controversy, Ham-Mihan mentioned rumors it could not independently confirm or deny, that according to security protocols, one or two escort helicopters should have accompanied the helicopter carrying the President. However, the helicopter carrying Raisi and his companions lacked an escort. This security mistake is considered one of the greatest blunders in recent Iranian history, the paper said.

Further complicating the narrative, the responsible authority for investigating the reasons behind the crash, ruled out "an explosion caused by sabotage during the flight and moments before the collision with the slopes" in a report issued on May 29.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces released a second report later, ruling out sabotage and confirming that no maintenance defects or violations of capacity limits were found. However, the report did little to quell the public's doubts.

Noghrekar also pointed out the outdated nature of the Bell 212 helicopter, purchased from Canada in 1994, which had been in service for more than three decades and lacked essential weather radar. This detail underscores the broader issue of Iran's aging aviation fleet, exacerbated by international sanctions that hinder the renewal of helicopters and airplanes, posing significant security risks.

"This issue has also posed numerous risks to the flight in terms of security indicators, making the flight conditions highly risky," he added.

Speculation and rumors have only intensified as official reports continue to provide inconclusive findings.

In a country already fraught with internal strife, the lack of clarity surrounding Raisi's death is particularly unsettling. The Solidarity of Iranian Republicans echoed these sentiments in a statement on May 30, highlighting the potential for “escalating mafia-like relationships” within the government if the crash was the result of an “internal conspiracy.”

Last October, Tehran and Khartoum announced in a joint statement the resumption of their diplomatic relations, seven years after Sudan decided to cut its relations with Iran following an attack on the Saudi Arabian embassy in Iran.

On Sunday, Sudan’s de facto leader and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan received Iran's new ambassador Hassan Shah-Hosseini in Port Sudan and sent Abdelaziz Hassan Saleh as the African country’s ambassador to Tehran.

This is “the beginning of a new phase in the course of bilateral relations between the two countries," Sudanese Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Hussein al-Amin said.

The rapprochement comes as the army-aligned government of Sudan is scrambling for allies during its war with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Over the course of the 15-month battle between the two sides, the Sudanese government has been loyal to the army.

The backdrop of Sudan's civil war has become a battleground for regional powers vying for strategic influence. Sudan's military, engaged in conflict with paramilitary forces, has sought external support, including drones from Iran, to gain the upper hand in the ongoing conflict.

Shortly after Iran and Sudan agreed to restore their relations last year, a delegation of Sudanese officials visited Iran on a mission to purchase Iranian-made drones, after a UN arms trade embargo expired in October.

Informed sources disclosed to Iran International that the delegation's primary objective was to acquire knowledge on the operation and utilization of the drones, which have been seen to be used in the likes of Russia's war on Ukraine and by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

In February, the United States voiced concern at reported arms shipments by Iran to Sudan’s military. John Godfrey, the US ambassador to Sudan, said Washington was "deeply concerned by external support" to both the Sudan Armed Forces and rival Rapid Support Forces.

"There are reports about resumed ties between Sudan and Iran that could reportedly include Iranian materiel support to SAF, which is also very troubling and a source of great concern for us," Godfrey said at the time.

With the Sudanese army in control along the Red Sea, a large Iranian presence would alarm Western powers as Yemen's Houthi rebels, on the other side of the key maritime transit lane, have been firing on international shipping since the Israel-Hamas war.

In March this year, Sudan reportedly rejected Iran's attempt to establish a permanent naval base on Sudan's Red Sea coast to monitor maritime traffic to and from the Suez Canal and Israel.

Ahmad Hasan Mohamed, intelligence adviser to Sudan’s military leader, said Iran had offered explosive drones to Sudan's military to combat rebel forces amid the civil war and proposed a helicopter-carrying warship in exchange for permission to build the base. However, Sudan rejected the deal to avoid straining relations with the United States and Israel.

The Ministry of Intelligence is accused of being involved in the systematic forced disappearance of dissidents and obtaining forced confessions from political prisoners. However, the Islamic Republic's intelligence minister claims the ministry has used its increased budget for confronting the country's archrival Israel.

"With a tenfold infrastructural budget, pursued by Raisi and the parliament through the budget law, we were able to expand our security infrastructure and effectively counter Israel," said Esmail Khatib, the Minister of Intelligence, in a report on the government's three-year performance.

Khatib's admission of a tenfold budget increase for Ministry of Intelligence under the Raisi administration has raised alarm bells. While ordinary Iranians struggle with economic hardships, their government is channeling unprecedented resources into its intelligence apparatus, prioritizing cyber warfare and international espionage over the welfare of its citizens.

The Financial Times reported in 2022 on the Iranian government's deep-seated fear of Israeli operations within Iran, suggesting that Israel has established a widespread network capable of operating freely within the country.

In recent years, the Islamic Republic has accused Israel of eliminating its key nuclear officials and stealing confidential nuclear documents. One high-profile incident involved Mossad agents stealing a massive cache of nuclear documents from a warehouse near Tehran in January 2018, as mentioned by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The increase in funding also coincides with a notable uptick in cyber-attacks carried out by hacker groups affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence. A recent report by cybersecurity firm Check Point highlighted that the hacker group MuddyWater has launched a series of global attacks using newly developed malware.

Since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, which claimed the lives of almost 1,200 people mostly civilians, such cyber-attacks have intensified, targeting countries like Israel, Turkey, Algeria, Italy, and Egypt. Such aggressive cyber activity seems to be a direct result of the substantial budget increase, allowing Iran to bolster its security infrastructure at the expense of its people.

In his Sunday report, Iran's Intelligence Minister also claimed that after the Syria conflict, members of armed groups like ISIS entered Iran but were all arrested by Iranian security forces. However, his assertion rings hollow considering the deadly attacks that have occurred during Raisi's presidency, including the January 3 explosions at Qassem Soleimani's burial site in Kerman, which resulted in nearly 100 deaths and over 300 injuries. ISIS claimed responsibility, yet suspicions about the Islamic Republic's involvement linger, further undermining the perceived strength of Iran's military and security forces.