Iranian reportedly commits suicide after killing wife in Canada

An unidentified group of worshippers at Imam Khomeini Mosalla can be seen in a viral video chanting against former Foreign Minister Zarif, telling him to "get lost." Zarif heads the Pezeshkian administration's Strategic Council for Transition, which was formed to search for and propose ministerial candidates.

Numerous politicians and pundits, mainly but not limited to reform faction, swiftly rallied to Zarif's defense on social media, with some even suggesting that “Mossad” orchestrated the criticism against him.

Abdolreza Davari, a former aide to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, called on the country's security agencies to review the video to identify and arrest the instigators. He asserted, "There should be no doubt that the scene of insulting Javad Zarif is a Mossad plan."

A prominent reformist political analyst, Abbas Abdi, remarked, "The chanting against Zarif during Friday prayers demonstrates their utter inability to tolerate any loss of privilege. Moreover, they show no respect for the sanctity of Friday prayers, misusing and destroying religious and public resources for their misguided objectives."

The X account of Pezeshkian's election campaign, now rebranded as "Iran News," condemned the actions depicted in the video as "the insults and abuses of a negligible minority." The account further questioned the origins of these “planned actions,” asking, "Where are these directives coming from?"

The apparent campaign against Pezeshkian grew even more severe on Saturday, as several hardline papers, including Kayhan—financed by the office of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—began assailing the new president for surrounding himself with "corrupt political thugs."

"The rightful place for those convicted of security offenses and the instigators of sedition, corruption, and destruction is in the courtroom, not on the council responsible for selecting the cabinet," Kayhan wrote, apparently referring to former officials who served under President Hassan Rouhani.

Supporters of Pezeshkian assert that the Strategic Council, with Zarif at its helm, demonstrates his commitment to his campaign pledge of leveraging expert advice to tackle pressing issues.

However, hardliners contend that Pezeshkian remains largely inactive, encircled by what they derisively term "incompetents."

Amidst the turmoil, Pezeshkian's supporters raise a pertinent question: Where do these directives originate? More precisely, what is their true source if these actions are indeed orchestrated rather than spontaneous?

The potential answers become intricate in light of last week's Reuters report, which stated, "Khamenei decided to plan a carefully orchestrated election, setting the stage for a little-known but trusted moderate, Massoud Pezeshkian, to rise to the presidency."

Reuters reported that the "engineered" election was driven by Khamenei's belief that Iran needed "a president who could appeal to different layers of society but would not challenge the ruling Shi'ite theocracy."

This implies that Khamenei may be seeking to avoid repeating the mistake of hastily endorsing Ahmadinejad's ascent to the presidency. Some analysts posit that Ahmadinejad's win in 2005 was primarily attributable to Khamenei's endorsement and that his approval legitimized Ahmadinejad’s highly contested reelection in 2009.

However, Ahmadinejad ultimately rebelled against Khamenei, leading to his subsequent isolation within the political arena.

When Kayhan, often regarded as Khamenei’s mouthpiece, fervently criticizes Pezeshkian, it may be a calculated effort to ensure his continued obedience—a trait he has consistently demonstrated thus far.

Another underlying reason for the criticisms is that hardliners, despite not securing the presidency, are eager to gain positions within Pezeshkian's cabinet—a prospect that appears unlikely if Zarif remains the one selecting the appointees.

Kayhan has explicitly issued a warning, stating, "Given that the elected president often references Quranic verses, I suggest he retain some members of Martyr Ebrahim Raisi's cabinet, who have made significant contributions and established a strong foundation for the country's progress, to prevent any disruptions in the government's ongoing affairs."

The hardliners hold a majority in parliament, so Pezeshkian cabinet selections must secure their approval. These lawmakers have made it clear they will obstruct the process if their demands are not met.

This situation underscores the rationale of some who boycotted the elections, arguing that even with a reform-leaning candidate, substantive change remains impossible within this system.

However, despite the people's and businesses' priority of addressing economic problems, Iranian economist Morteza Afqah from the University of Ahvaz says no significant economic breakthrough is expected in the near future. Afqah warned that opponents of the new government might obstruct economic developments, hoping that the "bitter experience" of hardliners blocking economic reforms under reformist President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) will not recur during Pezeshkian's administration.

Speaking to Fararu website in Tehran, Afqah emphasized that while the focus is on the new government's cabinet choices, it's equally important to carefully select local provincial officials, as a significant part of national production occurs in the provinces. He added that a competent executive team could activate unused potentials and solve 20 to 30 percent of the country's economic problems.

Afqah criticized the Raisi administration for having one of Iran's worst economic teams, describing the "difficult situation" as a combination of severe sanctions and a lack of financial resources, with very little hard currency in the foreign currency reserve fund.

This situation persists, and the nation's hope lies in Pezeshkian's potential to initiate a new round of talks with the United States to lift some sanctions. Afqah noted that developments in the United States could also impact Iran's markets. Iran’s political establishment fears the return of Donald trump, expecting tougher sanctions and more isolation.

Another Iranian website, Rouydad24 pointed out that as the likelihood of Donald Trump's election as the next US President increases, the it gives rise to expectations about higher inflation in Iran. However, the website's writer Amir Hossein Jafari opined that only a moderate president in Iran can tackle this challenge. Jafari added that many in Iran believe that Trump is man who can make a deal that would lead to a reduction in Iran’s inflation rate and reduction of the sanctions against Iran.

Trump has stated in recent years that he could make a deal with Iran. However, it is doubtful that Iranian officials, particularly Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, would overlook their pronounced enmity towards Trump after he ordered the killing of former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani. Earlier this week, media reported that US security officials raised alarms about possible plots against Trump by Iranian agents in the United States.

Rouydad24 also quoted Afqah saying that Iran's next government could curb inflation expectations through diplomacy. However, the question remains: Will Khamenei and other hardliners stay silent if Pezeshkian attempts rapprochement with the United States, and is Pezeshkian capable of pursuing such diplomacy for Iran?

The media have also quoted Republican Vice-Presidential nominee J.D. Vance discussing a tough approach to Iran. However, the next US administration's priority is likely to be addressing the war in Ukraine, with the Iran issue potentially coming later.

Meanwhile, both the media and economists in Iran are pessimistic about the further rise in the inflation rate, estimated to be around 50 percent in the absence of transparent statistics. As Afqah points out, "Pezeshkian cannot make any change in this situation if sanctions are not lifted."

Mohammad Dehghan, Iran's Vice President for Legal Affairs, mentioned the Judiciary in stating that the Central Bank currently holds the assets returned by Zanjani in unspecified forms of goods. Dehghan notably refrained from providing details about their type or value.

Zanjani, an intermediary in selling Iran's sanctioned oil, was arrested in 2013 and initially sentenced to death for embezzling billions in oil revenue. However, his sentence was commuted in April to a 20-year prison term. The Iranian judiciary asserted that Zanjani's cooperation with authorities and the successful identification and repatriation of his foreign assets were pivotal factors in the commutation of his sentence.

"These goods have the potential to bolster the national currency. Moreover, as per his [Zanjani’s] statement, should the Central Bank, due to certain considerations, choose not to use these goods as backing for the national currency, it has the option to sell them and utilize the proceeds," Dehghan said on Friday.

Despite the secrecy surrounding the government's deal with the tycoon, gold seems to be the only commodity that could potentially back the currency. Many commentators and politicians over the years have hinted that Zanjani had accomplices in high places, otherwise he could not have embezzled large sums, or would have been executed by now.

Dehghan further attempted to bolster Zanjani's reputation, noting that he had already served over a decade of his sentence. Dehghan added, "According to our information, he has stated that if the assets he transferred to the country encounter issues being sold and converted into cash, he can sell them himself.”

Zanjani, once hailed as Iran's richest man, described himself as a soldier of the Islamic Revolution, working on the economic front to help the country evade crippling sanctions imposed by the United Nations over Iran's nuclear program in the early 2010s.

To address the sanctions and economic challenges, ultraconservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad permitted the private sector to sell oil internationally. In response, Zanjani and other individuals established complex networks. They laundered money globally, including in Turkey, Indonesia, and Central Asia, aided by a clandestine team.

Once valued at approximately $13.5 billion, Zanjani's wealth was extraordinary in a nation where the state controls most of the economy. Today, one-third of Iran’s population lives below the poverty line.

By evading sanctions, Zanjani faced international penalties from the EU in December 2012 and the US in April 2013. Domestically, under President Hassan Rouhani, he was arrested and convicted, with the Ministry of Oil claiming he owed the government $1.9 billion in oil revenues.

Zanjani's alleged repatriation of assets unfolds against a backdrop of monumental economic challenges. The country grapples with persistent oil export and banking restrictions, capping oil exports at approximately $70 billion. Consequently, the government continually faces substantial budget deficits, necessitating the perpetual printing of money.

The organization called on its supporters to send letters to Iran’s head of judiciary, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, advocating for Salehi's release and the dropping of all charges against him.

On July 10, intelligence agents interrogated Salehi without a lawyer present, focusing on new cases related to his song "Typhus," which was released in March 2024 while he was imprisoned.

Salehi now faces four charges: “spreading propaganda against the system” and “inciting people to war and killing with the intention to disrupt national security” before the Revolutionary Court, and “insulting religious sanctities” and “spreading lies with the intention of disturbing public opinion” in a criminal court.

Amnesty warned that if convicted on these charges, Salehi faces prolonged imprisonment.

In the song, Salehi criticizes state-supported rappers in a style known as a "diss" in the hip-hop genre. None of the charges, including inciting war, spreading propaganda, insulting religious sanctities, or disturbing public opinion, are evidenced in the track. Amnesty International has labeled these charges as “spurious,” noting that Salehi is being targeted solely for his peaceful exercise of human rights, including freedom of expression through his music.

The Iranian judiciary has a history of building cases against dissidents on trumped-up charges to silence dissent. Negin Niknaam, an Iranian activist and Salehi's social media manager, told Iran International English on Friday that Iran's intelligence agencies have levied new charges against Salehi to prevent his release on bail after previous efforts to execute him sparked global outrage.

Salehi was first arrested on September 13, 2021, in a separate case following the release of the track “Mouse Hole.” He was arbitrarily detained for a second time on October 30, 2022, during Iran’s nationwide Women, Life, Freedom uprising on various charges including “corruption on earth” for which he was sentenced to death in April 2024.

Although he was granted bail on November 18, 2023, the 33-year-old rapper was re-arrested less than two weeks later on new charges of "publishing falsehoods" and “propaganda against the state” for which he was sentenced to one-year imprisonment after releasing a video detailing his torture experiences in custody. Currently, Salehi remains imprisoned at Dastgerd Prison in Esfahan serving the one-year prison sentence while awaiting the legal outcome of the 2022 case against him following the overturning of his death sentence. However, since his arrest in October 2022 Salehi has been in prison for almost 2 years.

However, with the new charges brought against the rapper and the pending re-sentencing from the 2022 case, his fate remains unknown.

Amnesty further noted that Salehi continues to suffer from torture-related injuries, including pain in his leg and hands for which he needs surgery, but the authorities have denied him access to adequate medical care.

Some pundits interpret Pezeshkian’s much-publicized participation at these ceremonies, and his speeches in some instances, as an attempt to appeal to a broader population than those who voted for him in the recent snap elections, during which most famed and influential ‘eulogists’ (maddahs) publicly endorsed his rivals.

Ashura, the anniversary of the killing of Shias’ Imam Hussein 1,400 years ago, is one of the most significant dates on Iran’s religious and political calendar. Hussein, the son of Ali—the fourth Caliph after Prophet Muhammad—and himself a victim of assassination, was killed in a dispute over who should rule the expanding Arab empire. This event is central to Shia Islam, which primarily continues the power dispute from fourteen centuries ago.

Iran’s clerical regime is based on the religious ideology that regards Ali and Hussein as the rightful heirs to Muhammad and Islam. Therefore, religious symbolism plays a crucial role in the politics of the Islamic Republic. The Shiite rulers believe their legitimacy draws from Hussein’s killing on October 10, 680. They pay special attention to Ashura and other religious occasions to mobilize people and claim political support through various ceremonies.

Maddahs play an increasingly influential role in the regime's religious propaganda. They are laymen who perform eulogies of Shia imams, often accompanied by stirring music to attract younger audiences at religious gatherings. Since the 1990s, the status of maddahs in mourning ceremonies has significantly expanded, elevating their role to be on par with, if not more prominent than, that of clerics.

Some maddahs have also formed strong political alliances with rival politicians. They comment on political matters and disputes and together with their congregations often act as political pressure groups. Sitting next to a ceremony's maddah is usually interpreted as a political endorsement.

Some famous maddahs supported the ultra-hardliner Saeed Jalili in the recent snap elections while others rallied behind his more pragmatist rival Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf.

Maddahs and their profession enjoy Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s support. Some maddahs known for their highly aggressive political views often perform at his public mourning events.

The Jomhouri Eslami newspaper, a conservative daily run by a cleric in Tehran, described the increasing involvement of maddahs and their mourning groups in politics as "political games," a "bitter fact," and a "deadly disease" that cannot be ignored.

The paper argued in article on July 14 that endorsements by maddahs and their claims that “saving Islam depended on voting for one or another of the candidates” and that the victory of the rival could “obliterate religion” represent “a clear deviation” from the righteous path.

“Some of these people desire to appoint presidents and some others are seeking to turn the Islamic Republic into a ‘republic of maddahs’!” the newspaper which often voices the concerns of conservative clerics wrote.

Some well-known maddahs, such as Mansour Arzi and Mahmoud Karimi, have insulted and slandered high-ranking political figures, including presidents like Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and Hassan Rouhani, in their highly politically charged eulogies. These maddahs have acted with immunity, especially when their actions were perceived as aligning with Khamenei's wishes. In fact, the rise of maddahs has coincided with the ascendancy of Khamenei in the past three decades.

Maddahs are often affiliated with one or more mourning groups (hey’at), which may be funded entirely or partially by donations from various sources, including mosques, neighborhood residents, clerics or groups of clerics, guilds, wealthy and influential business owners, government bodies, and municipalities.

The principal role of hey’ats is organizing gatherings to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein.

The ceremonies and processions take place mainly during the first ten days of the Islamic month of Muharram and on Arba’in (Arbaeen) that marks the fortieth day of the Imam’s martyrdom.

Hey’ats, which played a significant political role in Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1901, the uprising that followed the arrest of Ruhollah Khomeini in 1963, as well as the Islamic Revolution of 1979 have also assumed the role of political pressure groups over the past three decades.

Some hey’ats and their maddahs are believed to be closely connected with the Revolutionary Guards’ (IRGC) militia force (Basij) and security forces.

There are at least 150,000 maddahs in Iran now some of whom receive “astronomical” sums as “gifts” for their much-advertised performances from hey’ats as well as benefits and healthcare services from government and state propaganda bodies.