PODCAST - Eye for Iran : The Race to Replace Raisi

“Raisi was nurturing vipers in his bosom. It's perplexing to see these government ministers, who were supposedly in mourning just two weeks ago, now eagerly vying for the presidency. Why the sudden change of heart? Gholam-Ali Jafarzadeh Imanabadi said in an interview with Eslahat News on Friday.

Five members of the current government have registered to participate in the upcoming snap presidential election, a decision critics have characterized as odd, since allegedly as a coherent coalition, they could not decide on a candidate before they registered to run.

Imanabadi, referencing Bazrpash, the incumbent transport minister, remarked, "Some individuals, without providing explanations for their last-minute change of helicopter, have now swiftly prepared comprehensive program books for the forthcoming administration in a matter of days."

“How were they able to draft an extensive presidential agenda within just two weeks of the helicopter crash? This raises doubts and inquiries among the populace, particularly considering lingering uncertainties surrounding the crash,” he added.

Even before Raisi's body was recovered from the crash site last month, there were rumors about Bazrpash's sudden change of plans and refusal to board the same helicopter as Raisi.

Journalist Fariborz Kalantari claimed that Bazrpash and his team had convened a meeting on May 22 to strategize his candidacy in the June 28 elections to succeed Raisi.

In registering his candidacy, Bazrpash presented reporters with a voluminous document purportedly outlining his government's comprehensive plan.

The Guardian Council's approved presidential candidates, to be announced next week, will each have an allocated time to air their promotional campaigns on state TV starting June 12 until June 26.

The presidential debates will also be broadcast live.

The IRIB’s election headquarters’ warning, issued alongside guidelines for candidate ads on Thursday, prohibited content that could “sow doubt,” “undermine the Islamic Republic's achievements,” or “erode public trust in the electoral process.”

The US and EU sanctioned IRIB in 2013, and 2022 for being a "critical tool of the Iranian government's mass suppression and censorship campaign against its people.”

An opinion survey by the Netherlands-based Gamaan Institute last year collected information from 38,445 people inside Iran about their views on media, revealing that only about 21 percent of the respondents followed the developments about Iran from IRIB.

Criticism of the current administration, particularly under Ebrahim Raisi, whose death last month triggered the snap election, will be closely scrutinized, with any perceived negative portrayal risking exclusion from national media coverage.

The directive came amid broader restrictions on media content ahead of elections, warning the candidates to refrain from defamation and actions detrimental to national unity and participation.

Iran's Press Supervisory Board also warned that violators would be punished with 74 lashes if found guilty.

According to instructions published on Wednesday, disseminating material that promotes "the boycott of elections and lower participation" and "organizing unauthorized protests, strikes, or sit-ins" constitutes a crime.

Iran's Minister of Intelligence also stated that his agency is closely monitoring the behavior of presidential candidates and their supporters, warning that those promoting "subversive" narratives will be prosecuted.

The warnings follow the Supreme Leader's address on Monday, in which he urged competitors to avoid slander and refrain from smearing each other.

These cautions are issued amid a backdrop where several candidates, among them Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Mostafa Pour Mohammadi, are linked to cases of corruption and human rights violations, where the electoral debates may provide an opportunity for candidates to expose each other.

Ghalibaf, the conservative parliament speaker and former mayor of Tehran, was embroiled in multiple financial scandals involving his immediate aides. Several of his associates, who were also former IRGC officers, were tried and convicted in cases involving approximately $5 billion.

The Iranian politician Pour Mohammadi, who served as interior minister and justice minister in two different administrations, was on the "Death Commission" responsible for the execution of thousands of Iranian political prisoners during the 1980s.

Despite many warnings, the usual protocol—where candidates launch their campaigns and engage in verbal sparring after receiving approval from the Guardian Council, a 12-member non-elected oversight body—has been disrupted, with confrontations starting prematurely this time.

A high-profile clash erupted between Ghalibaf and Vahid Haghanian, a prominent figure in the Office of the Supreme Leader of Iran and a presidential candidate, drawing significant attention. Media affiliated with the IRGC criticized Haghanian and supported Ghalibaf.

The clearest reference that the IRGC has a ‘preferred’ candidate was made Wednesday by Vahid Haghanian, a former close aide to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in a statement published Wednesday.

Tasnim news website affiliated with the IRGC on Tuesday attacked Haghanian on for declaring his candidacy and said he lacked the required qualifications. It also alleged that Haghanian’s campaign was focused on the false claim that Khamenei’s office supported his candidacy.

Without directly naming Tasnim, Haghanian, who claims his decision to run was personal, has stated that the "desperate attempts" to discredit him stem from the IRGC-affiliated media's "fear" that their preferred candidate would be defeated.

Haghanian’s quarrel with Tasnim revealed that Ghalibaf is the candidate supported by the IRGC, the UK-based Iranian political analyst Shahir Shahidsaless maintained in a tweet on Wednesday.

“Therefore, it is conceivable that Ghalibaf broke his promise (that he would not run for president if he won the parliament’s speakership last month) and that his last-minute registration resulted from the IRGC’s insistence [on his candidacy],” he added.

In his statement, Haghanian pledged to "re-direct" the role of military-affiliated media outlets that benefit from its budget, preventing them from intervening in politics. He emphasized that the interference of the military in politics was prohibited by both the founder of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the law.

In recent months, the IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency and Javan newspaper have repeatedly defended Ghalibaf against political rivals who have demanded answers to allegations of corruption against him and his family.

In a live TV program a few days after the Parliamentary elections of March 1, ultra-hardliner lawmaker Hamid Rasaei accused Tasnim and Javan newspaper of being at Ghalibaf’s service.

Tasnim’s promotion of Ghalibaf against the Paydari Party hardliners in the newly elected parliament was expressed by calling his win the vote for speakership “lawmakers’ No to Destruction”.

Ahead of the parliament’s presidium elections in April 2022, Javan had accused Ghalibaf’s opponents of “cowardly” attempt to destroy his reputation following a scandal that came to be known as Layette Gate.

Radical right-wingers’ attacks on Ghalibaf have intensified on social media since his last-minute announcement, only a few days after being voted as speaker of the new parliament, that he was running for presidency.

Ali-Akbar Raefipour, an ultra-hardliner who led one of the three major election coalitions within the Principlist camp during the March parliamentary elections in Tehran, is at the forefront of the attacks against Ghalibaf.

Without directly naming Raefipour but providing obvious clues for all to understand, an editorial Thursday, June 6, in the IRGC-linked Javan newspaper accused Raefipour and his supporters of “destruction with abuse and slander”.

“This group’s activities in the parliamentary elections of March were of the same nature. Instead of political vitality, they created division and gloom among hezbollahis (revolutionaries),” the editorial said. “It’s not clear why no one is taking action against them despite numerous violations and putrefying the election atmosphere,” Javan wrote.

Raefipour, who heads the Masaf Institute—a cultural entity with charity status—has been accused of misusing over half a million dollars of donors' money for payments to other organizations, which then funneled the funds back to him, his family members, and his allies.

Raefipour and his supporters, who recently formed the political group Jebhe-ye Sobh-e Iran (Iran Morning Front), call themselves "revolutionaries."

Ghalibaf’s popularity among conservatives has alarmingly declined. He came fourth in the parliamentary elections of March 1 in Tehran with 400,000 votes, one-third of his votes in 2020. He was behind three radical right-wingers including Amir-Hossein Sabeti, a young ultra-hardliner TV presenter with scarce political experience. .

Ghalibaf and his supporters are often referred to as ‘Neo-Principlists’. This refers to his call for reforms in the outlook and methods of Khamenei’s hardline supporters to set himself apart from others, and to build himself a support base among the younger generation of hardliners after his defeat in the presidential elections of 2017.

The prince, a prominent opposition leader, wrote on X: “This Biblical relationship is not merely a relic of the past. It can inspire a new era of lasting peace for our region, including Iranians, Israelis, and Arabs.”

In April of last year, Pahlavi, known for his vocal advocacy for improving Israeli-Iranian relations, undertook a journey to Israel to " deliver a message of friendship from the Iranian people.”

This gesture stood in stark contrast to the actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose leadership has consistently exhibited a pattern of Holocaust denial, further exacerbated by the organization of conferences and the sponsorship of cartoon competitions trivializing one of the greatest mass killings of the 20th century.

Minister Chikli, reflecting on his meeting with Pahlavi, expressed his optimism that the prince's leadership will pave the way for “peace and prosperity in Iran and the Middle East and restore the historical alliance between Iran and Israel.”

The Israeli official also threaded a picture of their meeting to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's post on X using only a dot as the caption. This was a tribute to the recently arrested Iranian blogger who is allegedly accused by the clerical government's security of being an Israeli spy.

Iranian blogger Hossein Shanbehzadeh was arrested earlier this week, accused of being a "fugitive Mossad agent" who has insulted religious figures in the past. His family rejects the allegations.

Shanbehzadeh last month posted a sarcastic comment—a single dot—in response to a tweet by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. His remark received more likes than Khamenei's original post. In the wake of his arrest, many users expressed their outrage, linking the detention to his comment on Khamenei's post, which had gained substantial attention

In the context of the ongoing conflict in Gaza, while Iran’s authoritarian government repeatedly called for the destruction of Israel since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iranian activists and social media users assert that Hamas bears direct responsibility for the war and the resulting deaths of Palestinian civilians and children, whom it employs as 'human shields.'

These critics are part of a significant segment of the Iranian population that contends their nation has suffered under the oppressive regime of the Islamic Republic. This regime not only represses its citizens but also channels its resources to support and arm Hamas, further entangling Iranian funds in the conflict.

The sources, who Iran International has not identified for their protection, are connected to a security apparatus in the Middle East.

They allege these individuals are not declaring their identity and are armed with weapons on the ship in European ports, specifically: Constanta (Romania) , Valencia (Spain) , Ravenna (Italy), and Antwerp (Belgium).

Sources said these armed IRGC forces may use this method as a means to spy and collect information in Europe - all while reportedly bypassing sanctions.

The European Union (EU) has imposed numerous sanctions against the Islamic Republic - including individuals with the IRGC, government officials and entities. This is in response to Iran's human rights abuses, nuclear proliferation activities and military support for Russia's war in Ukraine.

To date, 227 individuals and 42 entities have been sanctioned.

In May, the EU added new sanctions targeting persons and entities supplying, selling or involved in the transferring of Iran's missiles and drones in support of the Kremlin and for armed groups in the Middle-East and the Red Sea.

Defense and security analyst Farzin Nadimi, a Senior Fellow with the Washington Institute, said that onboard armed guards are usually not allowed in European ports, unless there is a reason, in which case they must identify themselves as per individual port regulations.

Iran International’s sources said the alleged IRGC men concealed themselves as ordinary seafarers to circumvent Iran’s sanctions to allegedly engage in nefarious activities. An action that violates International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations, said Nadimi, who specializes in military affairs.

“They [armed guards] are needed only for the pirates…pirate infested waters,” said Nadimi.

“Many shipping corridors, shipping lanes or canals like the Suez Canal do not usually allow armed guards aboard commercial ships,” he added.

The IMO responded to Iran International’s investigation, stating in an email, that "Flag States set the level of security on board their ships and approve their ships’ security plans, including requirements for armed personnel. Port States will also set their own requirements for ships that want to dock in their ports."

Spain and Romania, for example, require a declaration and authorization of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) and weapons in their ports. This can only be in areas deemed ‘high risk’, which according to their port regulations online is "an area as defined in the Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (MSC.1/Circ.1339) unless otherwise defined by the flag State."

With regards to Iran, the IMO said it does “not have specific information on the use of armed personnel on IRI flag ships.”

Maritime "Smuggling"

Sources said the IRGC is transporting Quds forces and weaponry from Iran to Syria by sea before entering European ports.

Iran’s alleged use of armed IRGC men and smuggling weaponry for its proxies is likely in response to Israeli attacks on air and land infrastructure in Syria and Lebanon, according to Jason Brodsky, the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran.

In 2021, the port of Latakia was targeted by air strikes, but Israel did not claim to be behind it. Though it is not unusual for Israel not to take responsibility for operations in Syria.

“They [Iran] are adjusting the routes, the smuggling routes that they have used in the past from land to air and now to maritime smuggling. And that's because Israel has targeted a lot of the land and air corridors,” said Brodsky.

A recent report by the Telegraph, citing sources in Israel, alleged that Iran uses European ports to provide cover for shipments of weapons to Hezbollah.

The unnamed sources told the British outlet that Hezbollah has received missiles and bombs on ships that go on to dock in European ports like Belgium, Spain and Italy. Those weapons are reportedly used to attack Israel.

“It goes to Hezbollah. It goes to militias in Syria. It goes to, Palestinian militant groups, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” said Brodsky.

Brodsky said the IRGC is highly skilled at smuggling arms, oil, people, and goods for its “nefarious purposes worldwide.”

In 2022, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned members of an international oil smuggling network that reportedly facilitated oil trades and generated revenue for Hezbollah and the IRCG-Qods Force.

Brodsky said the ships likely bypass customs with “payoffs” and attempts to make the cargo look “benign” embedding weapons, for example, in a ship meant for humanitarian cargo.

“These networks are predominantly for the Quds Force to ship illicit contraband and other kinds of products to avoid a paper trail and to try to legitimize the cargo that they're using,” said Brodsky.

Richard Goldberg, a Senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) said that Iran, especially since the October 7 massacre, is on a march to strengthen itself around the world and is on the offence.

Armed IRGC operatives on board these fleets is not surprising to Goldberg, but he said it is concerning.

“They [Europe] may know about them, they may not even be looking for them. But they certainly allow them to fundraise, to activate, to recruit and potentially, move in and out of their countries, at various ports. Because their names are not on list to be denied visas or entry.”

Goldberg said it’s further evidence for the European Union (EU) to enlist the IRGC a terrorist entity and push for greater alliances across the transatlantic.

“To build a transatlantic alliance to counter these malign activities that are a danger not just to European soil, but ultimately to North America as well,” he said.