UN Nuclear Chief Both Alarmed and Hopeful Regarding Iran

“[President] Biden and [US Secretary of State Antony] Blinken will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon,” State Department deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel said in a press briefing.

He made the remarks in reaction to Sunday comments by Kamal Kharrazi, a senior advisor to Iran’s ruler Ali Khamenei, that the Islamic Republic would be left with no option but to alter its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatened its nuclear facilities or its existence.

“We continue to assess, though, that Iran is not taking any key activities that would be necessary to produce a testable nuclear device,” Patel told Iran International correspondent Samira Gharaei.

Kharazi said on Sunday that Iran does "not possess nuclear weapons, and there is a fatwa from the leader regarding this matter. But what should you do if the enemy threatens you? You will inevitably have to make changes to your doctrine."

Asked if these comments were a concern for the United States, Patel said, “We don't believe that the Supreme Leader has yet made a decision to resume the (nuclear) weaponization program that we judge Iran suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.”

When asked about the Biden administration's strategy toward a "nuclear threshold state" like Iran in the absence of ongoing negotiations, Patel told Iran International, "We have ways of communicating with Iran when it's in our interest, I'm not going to comment on that."

In a Monday press conference in Tehran, Iran's foreign ministry spokesman suggested that Kharrazi's remarks were not the official position of the Islamic Republic, and that Tehran's nuclear doctrine has not changed.

"Iran's official position on Weapons of Mass Destruction has been repeatedly declared by high-ranking Iranian officials, and there has been no change in Iran's nuclear doctrine," Nasser Kanaani told reporters in a briefing held on the sidelines of Tehran International Book Fair, citing a fatwa by Ali Khamenei on the prohibition of the production and use of nuclear weapons as the basis for Iran's position.

However, the fatwa Iranian officials refer to is not an irrevocable principle. Islamic fatwas can change or be reversed at a moment’s notice, experts have pointed out. Also, the alleged Khamenei fatwa is not actually a religious order, it is part of a statement he submitted to an international conference more than a decade ago.

Khamenei may invoke the principle of expediency to overrule his “anti-Nuclear” fatwa. The principle of expediency, as decreed by the founder of the Islamic Republic Ayatollah Khomeini in January 1988, stipulates that the Supreme Leader may even violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith in order to preserve “the Islamic Regime” as the preservation of the Islamic Regime supersedes all else.

Kharrazi on Sunday also raised the issue of Israel’s alleged nuclear arsenal and called for the Jewish state’s nuclear disarmament. “If Israel threatens other counties, they cannot remain silent,” he retorted.

Last week, Kharrazi had stated, “If they dare to strike Iran's nuclear facilities, our level of deterrence will change. We have experienced deterrence at the conventional level so far. If they intend to strike Iran's nuclear capabilities, naturally, it could lead to a change in Iran's nuclear doctrine.”

In recent weeks, Iran has evoked the option of using the nuclear option as a deterrent against the possibility of an Israeli strike against its atomic facilities, amid a new reality in the Middle East after the October 7 Hamas attack.

On Friday, Iranian lawmaker Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani claimed Iran might already possess a nuclear weapon.

He conveyed to the Rouydad 24 website his belief that Iran's decision to risk attacking Israel in April stemmed from its possession of nuclear weapons.

Ali-Akbar Salehi, who was foreign minister more than a decade ago and is still a key foreign policy voice in the Iranian government, also said last month that Iran has everything it needed to build a nuclear bomb, as tensions rose with Israel amid the Gaza war.

In a televised interview in April, Salehi, was asked if Iran has achieved the capability of developing a nuclear bomb. Avoiding a direct answer he stated, "We have [crossed] all the thresholds of nuclear science and technology.”

Salehi’s statement was preceded by a declaration from a Revolutionary Guard general. In the midst of tensions between the Islamic Republic and Israel, Ahmad Haghtalab, the IRGC commander of the Guard for the Protection and Security of Nuclear Facilities, announced on April 19 that if Israel intends to "use the threat of attacking our nuclear facilities as a tool to pressure Iran, a revision of the nuclear doctrine and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a shift from previously stated considerations is conceivable and likely."

Since early 2021, when the Biden administration opted for negotiations to restore the Obama-era JCPOA agreement, Iran has vastly expanded its uranium enrichment efforts and is now believed to have amassed enough fissile material for 3-5 nuclear warheads.

In a letter to the Guardian Council, he asserted that the Raisi Administration "neither has the capability to withdraw from the JCPOA nor the will to revive it."

Rouhani also lamented that the opportunity for reviving the JCPOA at the end of his term was thwarted by "the parliament's sabotage and the support of the Guardian Council."

President Ebrahim Raisi has recently echoed sentiments against expanding the nuclear deal by Rouhani, saying “Some wanted to announce in the country that we must reduce the shadow of war, negotiate on our missiles and military capabilities, and put JCPOA 2 and 3 on the table. However, the leadership said, 'What happened to JCPOA 1 that you want to put 2 and 3 on the table, and missiles are not negotiable."

The JCPOA, achieved in Vienna on July 14, 2015, involves Iran and major world powers including the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Under the agreement, Iran consented to reduce its nuclear capabilities in exchange for relief from economic sanctions.

However, the US withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 under President Donald Trump and the subsequent imposition of sanctions strained relations and crippled Iran’s economy.

Despite international scrutiny and ongoing diplomatic efforts, Iran has continued to enrich uranium up to 60-percent purity, a level that many outside observers argue has potential military applications.

On Tuesday, Rafael Grossi, the chief of the United Nations atomic watchdog, criticized Tehran for its "completely unsatisfactory" cooperation after his recent visit to Iran. During his trip, he had pressed Iranian leaders to implement "concrete" steps to resolve issues surrounding their nuclear program.

It came weeks after Grossi said Iran was dangerously close to making nuclear weapons.

Shariatmadari’s piece pushed for "the suspension of all Iran’s commitments under UN Security Council resolutions, including those concerning the nuclear dossier, and the expulsion of IAEA inspectors." His statement comes amid heightened rhetoric following the IAEA chief’s recent visit to Iran, which seems to have emboldened Iranian officials’ nuclear ambitions.

“This is the undeniable and legal right of our country. Do not trample on this undeniable right,” said Shariatmadari.

Meanwhile, Kamal Kharrazi, the Supreme Leader’s foreign policy advisor and former Iranian foreign minister, threatened a shift to nuclear deterrence if Israel attacks Iran’s nuclear facilities. The statement has been met with minimal reaction from the international community, with the US State Department merely labeling it "irresponsible."

“We have no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran's existence be threatened, there will be no choice but to change our military doctrine,” Kharrazi said.

During his visit, Grossi noted that although there was “no specific timeframe or deadline” for Iran to address its nuclear issues, he underscored the expectation for Iran to act quickly.

The escalatory dialogue follows the February 2024 announcement by former Iranian Atomic Energy Chief, Ali Akbar Salehi, who claimed Iran’s readiness to quickly produce sufficient fissile material for nuclear armament.

Grossi, recently warned that Iran is alarmingly close to achieving nuclear weapons capability, suggesting that the development of a nuclear bomb could be weeks away, should Khamenei decide to proceed.

On May 9, 2024, Kamal Kharrazi, the Supreme Leader’s foreign policy advisor and former Iranian foreign minister, said that Iran will consider a doctrinal shift to nuclear deterrence if Israel attacks Iran’s nuclear sites. Whilst there has been only a low-key “reprimand” by the US State Department’s Spokesperson to such a nakedly threatening statement, calling it “irresponsible,” the record indicates that neither of Iran’s public expressions of resorting to nuclear deterrence, nor its attempts at materializing this goal are new.

Biden administration would be very well advised to take this latest “statement of intent” by one of Supreme Leader’s own men all too seriously for it is being uttered in the context of Iran and Israel entering open conflict as of April 2024 after thirty-years of shadow wars.

Since the outbreak of the conflict between Israel and Hamas on October 7, Iran and its allied regional armed proxies militarily engaged Israel and the Western alliance on several fronts. Hezbollah began firing various daily barrages into northern Israel, whilst the Houthis started their incessant attack on international shipping lanes in the Red Sea, and Iranian armed proxies in Iraq and Syria each sent salvos of projectiles to US bases in the region and Israel. Matters came to a head when Israel and Iran clashed over Israel’s levelling of the Iranian Damascus’ consular annex that dispatched seven of the IRGC top brass. The result was an open and direct projectile warfare attack from Iran against Israel.

Eight days after the Israeli elimination of IRGC top brass in Damascus in early April, I stated in “Amid Serious Iran-Israel Tension, The Nuclear Elephant Is In The Room” that Khamenei’s regime could be considering resorting to nuclear deterrence despite its “religious” and “practical” disputations to the contrary. A few other analysts of note also identified this possibility shortly after my assessment was published on Iran International English.

Soon after Israel struck a radar site in Isfahan in retaliation for Iran’s failed barrage of projectiles, the IRGC commander, Brigadier Ahmad Haghtalab, in charge of the safety of nuclear sites in Iran, publicly declared that the regime may revise its present position vis-à-vis nuclear weapons and forge ahead to achieve full nuclear deterrence.

To date, the most unequivocal expression of preparedness for nuclear weaponization has been the February 2024 statement of the former Iranian Atomic Energy Chief, Ali Akbar Salehi, who not only did proclaim Iran’s ability to rapidly produce adequate amounts of fissile material to weaponize warheads, but also revealed that Iran had already manufactured all the parts required for the integration of weaponizable fissile material along with the requisite fuses, warheads, and missiles. In other words, he stated that Iran is almost ready to weaponize at moments notice.

Such statements that are being uttered with increased frequency may be dismissed as empty bravados and bluffs. There are some who argue that Russia and China, which have grave stakes in controlling a junior ally like Iran, may be loath to allow Iran to become a nuclear power. Others claim that even if Iran wishes to break out into full-fledged nuclear weaponization, it may not have the delivery platforms, nor may it have readily made fuses, not to mention that it first must leave the IAEA on Nuclear non-proliferation.

If history is any guide, the Islamic Republic of Iran has over thirty years of experience in developing projectile delivery devices, i.e., missiles, upon which nuclear warheads can be deployed. During 1990-1991, the IRGC and Iranian defense ministry missions visited North Korea to observe the launch of North Korea’s first intercontinental ballistic missiles. Such visits harbingered Iran’s Al’Qadir project, dedicated to developing missiles capable of deploying warheads of all kinds. Indeed, Iran and North Korea continue their decades-long cooperation on missile development including nuclear warhead technology.

Details on the will and progress of Khamenei’s regime to become a nuclear power is certainly available to President Joe Biden somewhere in the West Wing of the White House. The pressing question is why the present administration is not expressing the requisite serious alarm in the face of such nuclear weaponization bravados. Expression of such alarm would be especially warranted in the wake of Iran’s latest attempt at sending over three-hundred projectiles to Israel; projectiles that could have theoretically deployed nuclear warheads.

In the name of “de-escalation” and reducing tension in the region, Biden’s administration continues to conduct secret negotiations with Khamenei’s regime and has prevented the IAEA’s board of governors from censuring Iran for its hitherto refusal to cooperate with the IAEA monitoring and inspection teams. The most recent trips of the IAEA’s chief, Rafael Grossi, to Iran were nothing but a series of futile exercises in nuclear diplomacy that have led to no re-installation of surveillance equipment in the designated sites and no new timetable for further inspections.

Khamenei’s regime has engaged in double speak about many aspects of its ongoing difference with the US since President Donald Trump left the Iran Nuclear Deal in 2018 and the US introduced maximum pressure sanctions. On the one hand, the Iranian regime and its cohorts of apologists often claim that the sanctions have been hurting the Iranian people and demand their suspension. On the other, Iran constantly exclaims to the world that the sanctions have had little impact on the regime’s strength whilst the regime has committed unspeakable military grade brutal suppression of several popular uprisings from the 2019 Bloody November to the “Woman, Life, Freedom” 2022 uprising.

Similarly, the regime professes a “religious” and sacrosanct opposition to nuclear weapons, wrapped in the rhetoric of an anti-nuclear weapon’s “fatwa” since 2005. Based upon the secret documents that were brought to the attention of the world first in 2003, then in 2009 and later in 2018, the regime has been always pursuing a nuclear weapons program in secret. Despite their invocation of the anti-nuclear fatwa, regime officials have intensified their threats to embrace nuclear deterrence since 2018 when Trump left JCPOA. The frequency of such threats has just increased since February.

In view of PM Netanyahu’s defiant stance vis-à-vis President Biden’s threat that the US would refuse bombs to Israel should Israel attack Rafah, the US administration must be acutely aware the Islamic Republic of Iran may get a wrong signal from the US-Israel quarrel over Hamas and Gaza. Iran may in fact have been preparing itself for a nuclear breakout for quite a while and such squabbles can hasten it. There is not doubt that if Israeli intelligence confirms to any Israeli cabinet that Iran is approaching five minutes to midnight for nuclear warhead deployment, Israel may not hesitate to act to destroy whatever Iranian nuclear facilities that it can.

Biden cannot count on Russia and China to prevent Khamenei from resorting to nuclear deterrence. If Russia and China did ever truly have such intentions to ensure that nobody else would ever join the nuclear club of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, they would have “actively” stopped India, North Korea (especially since the late 1990s), and Pakistan from achieving nuclear weapons, and they did not. In fact, scholarly surveys do offer that China and Russia have been both “a cause” and “a contributor” to “nuclear” and “missile” proliferation in Asia. Hence, at a time that both Russia and China are at logger heads with the United States (be it under Trump or Biden), not only is there no incentive for them to deny Khamenei his nuclear weapons’ ambitions, but they may be motivated to check the US-leaning emerging Arab-Israel entente by a nuclear armed Iran.

Long before Russia declared that it treats the introduction of F-16sto the Ukrainian Air Force as a nuclear threat, Russia and Iran have been solidly united in one camp. In defiance to extensive Western sanctions, Iran has become an indispensable source of cheap oil for China, whilst being a major supplier of suicide drones, missiles, and bombs to Russia since 2022. Russia, China, and Iran have been constantly and notoriously testing the West’s resolve over the past year at every tactical, economic sanction, and military strategic juncture and the West’s restraint and caution has been interpreted as hesitation by them all too clearly.

Let us not forget that the US and Western alliance declared once that if Iran would cross the red line of enriching 60% plus uranium, they would activate “the trigger” stipulation of the UN Security Council Resolutions. It is true that Iran was in formal compliance of the JCPOA when President Trump abruptly pulled out of it, however, Iran’s mass uranium enrichment ever since has been on a scale that brings it dangerously close to weapons’ capacity and constitutes a clear and present threat to world peace that has so far been left unaddressed. In other words, the West has not reacted to Iran crossing the high-level nuclear enrichment redline.

Furthermore, Biden’s most recent squabble with Netanyahu only convinces the Iranian regime that he is too concerned with winning the Arab American and Muslim American vote for re-election and would not dare to act against an Iran that would be on the threshold of becoming a nuclear weapons’ state.

If Biden continues to dither and Iran breaks out towards nuclear warheads, whether Bibi Netanyahu is at the helm or not, Israel will not shrink from action. And if such eventuality ever materializes, the world must brace itself.

Pro-government Faraz daily website in Tehranhas expressed optimism about IAEA Chief Rafael Grossi's recent visit, suggesting it eased some tensions between Iran, the United States, and Western countries in general. The website hopes the visit will positively influence the revival of negotiations between the West and Iran.

In an interview with the same website, international relations expert Abdolreza Faraji-Rad remarked that Grossi had intended to visit Tehran for several months, but regional tensions and the conflict in Gaza delayed his trip. Faraji Rad implied that Iran's involvement in these events hindered Grossi's visit.

According to Faraji-Rad, during a meeting in Isfahan, Grossi and Iranian officials agreed to discuss three specific issues in their future meetings, though he did not disclose what these issues were. The talks in Esfahan thus far have yielded no concrete results. He cited Grossi stating that the IAEA hopes for Iran's cooperation in the upcoming meeting.

Faraji-Rad characterized Grossi's statement as both a carrot and a stick approach: cooperation from Iran could prevent the agency from issuing a resolution against it, but non-cooperation might lead to such a resolution and potentially trigger a snapback of sanctions. Despite these complexities, he noted that Grossi's visit generally helped to calm the situation temporarily.

When asked about potential impacts on the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran (JCPOA), Faraji remarked, "Iran still maintains that it has not withdrawn from the JCPOA, though it is now enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, well above the agreement’s cap of 67.3 percent. This complicates any further agreement, but change remains possible."

He also revealed that behind-the-scenes discussions with the U.S. have urged Iran to return to the agreed enrichment level, especially as the U.S. seeks to avoid escalating tensions ahead of its elections. Nevertheless, Faraji-Rad acknowledged that Iran's involvement in the Gaza conflict has negatively impacted its relations with Western countries.

Analysts speaking to Iran International TV have speculated that Grossi's visit to Iran would not have occurred without approval from Washington.

Meanwhile, another foreign policy analyst, the former chief of the Iranian parliament's Foreign Policy Committee, Heshmatollah Falahatpishjeh told Rouydad24 website that the United States has kept the door open to negotiations over the nuclear issue. He added that the current stable oil prices in international markets are working in favor of the United States.

Speaking sarcastically about Grossi's visit, Falahatpisheh said that "Grossi did not bring anything back from Iran other than a box of Gaz,” a popular nougat-like Persian delight.

Meanwhile, contradicting Faraji-Rad's comments about Iran and the JCPOA, Falahatpisheh asserted that Iran is adhering to its commitments under the JCPOA, though it has not politically benefited from the deal. He dismissed the visit as mere protocol, adding that the Iranian government is attempting to portray this unproductive visit as an achievement to maintain the appearance of engagement with the JCPOA. "The only path forward for the JCPOA is towards collapse," he stated.

On the other hand, Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi reiterated his dated revolutionary rhetoric concerning the 2015 nuclear deal, indicating that Iran's leadership, particularly Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, harbors mixed feelings about the JCPOA. He appears to dislike the agreement yet desires to reap its benefits. This ambivalence keeps the United States and Europe in a state of uncertainty, oscillating between moments of optimism about reaching an agreement and times when all hopes seem to diminish.

Raisi said that his predecessor President Hassan Rouhani wanted to impose JCPOA 2 and JCPOA 3 on the nation, but Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei objected and faced down the enemies in the same way he did in the recent missile attack on Israel. Mindless of the fact that what he said did not make perfect sense, he said: "Our rhetoric is about revolutionary rationalism, not about a diplomacy of begging."