Experts in Iran Display Divergent Responses to IAEA Chief's Visit

Underground Gas Storage facilities (UGS) are not man-made facilities, but are depleted oil or natural gas fields, aquifers, mines, and salt caverns that have the geological properties to store natural gas over long periods.

Despite initiatives under President Ebrahim Raisi's administration, progress on several UGS projects remains limited as of the end of 2023, according to a report from the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) obtained by Iran International.

Initially, Iran launched two UGS projects, Shourijeh and Serajeh, around twenty years ago, with a combined capacity of less than 3.5 billion cubic meters (bcm). However, as of summer 2023, only 3.1 bcm of gas had been injected into these facilities for consumption during the winter season. Their gas re-extraction capacity, totaling 30 million cubic meters per day (mcm), represents less than 4% of the winter peak consumption level, surpassing 850 mcm/d.

Iran has 250-300 mcm/d of gas deficit in winter and UGSs compensate only 10% of that. The NIGC’s report says the expansion of Serajeh phase 2 has developed by only 3% and Shourijeh phase 2 progressed only 17% as of end-2023, far behind the plan.

Additionally, the National Iranian Oil Company's exploration of three new UGSs has faced delays, with only modest progress made on two projects, raising uncertainty about their feasibility as gas storage facilities. These sites are situated in close proximity to major industrial cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, and Tabriz, where gas demand is high.

All of the exploration area for new UGSs are located very close to Iran’s industrial cities of Tehran, Isfahan and Tabriz.

Iran’s large industries need about 145 mcm/d of gas, but only 110 mcm/d was supplied during last winter due to severe gas shortage.

Although Iran holds the second largest reserves in the world, lack of investment in developing new fields and rehabilitating older ones has lagged behind in the past two decades due to lack of investments and technology. International and US sanctions, as well as financial mismanagement by the government have prevented Iran from fully exploiting its vast natural reserves.

In a related context, Mehdi Mahdavi Abhari, the Secretary-General of the Petrochemical Employers Association, announced last week that Iran lost $800 million in petrochemical exports due to gas shortages last year.

The document from the National Gas Company reveals that during the summer, nearly 70 million cubic meters of gas were supplied daily to petrochemical plants, 20 million cubic meters to cement factories, 36.5 million cubic meters to steel mills, and 17.7 million cubic meters to refineries. In total, during the summer, 145.5 mcm/d of gas were delivered to the country's major industries. However, on January 12 this year, this figure decreased to 110 mcm/d.

Global UGS industry

Iran’s neighbors Azerbaijan and Turkey have expanded their UGSs capacity to 3.5 bcm and 5 bcm respectively during past two years to enhance their export and transit abilities. Meanwhile, UAE and Saudi Arabia are also building their first UGS facilities.

Although there is no updated global UGS market report for 2023, 2022 witnessed a notable increase in capacity, driven by the global gas crisis. This underscores the importance of storage for supply security, with China and the Middle East emerging as key growth markets for UGS activities.

According to Cedigaz, the International Association offor Natural and renewable Gases, by the end of 2022, the world’s working gas capacity reached 429 bcm, a 1.3% rise from the previous year, with significant contributions from China and Europe. The peak withdrawal rate also rose by 1.7% to 7.3 bcm/d.

While the UGS market remains highly concentrated, with 5 countries (United States, Russia, Ukraine, Canada and Germany) accounting for almost 70% of global storage capacities, there is a clear shift of storage activity towards new, fast growing gas markets, China and the Middle East notably.

Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, re-elected to parliament in March, conveyed to the Rouydad 24 website his belief that Iran's decision to risk attacking Israel in April stemmed from its possession of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, he drew attention to remarks by Kamal Kharrazi, senior foreign policy advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on Thursday, who said that Tehran will change its nuclear doctrine if Israel attacks its atomic facilities. For years, the Islamic Republic has insisted that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful, despite enriching uranium to 60-percent purity, which can only have a weaponization purpose.

“In my opinion, we have achieved nuclear weapons, but we do not announce it. It means our policy is to possess nuclear bombs, but our declared policy is currently within the framework of the JCPOA. The reason is that when countries want to confront others, their capabilities must be compatible, and Iran's compatibility with America and Israel means that Iran must have nuclear weapons,” Ardestani was quoted as saying.

Clearly putting Iran in the same trench as Russia, Ardestani added, “In a climate where Russia has attacked Ukraine and Israel has attacked Gaza, and Iran is a staunch supporter of the Resistance Front, it is natural for the containment system to require that Iran possess nuclear bombs. However, whether Iran declares it is another matter.”

The conservative politician, hailing from Isfahan Province, representing a district close to the Natanz nuclear facility, is a trusted regime figure, because he was allowed to run and win in the tightly orchestrated March parliamentary elections.

Ardestani, 63, has served in the government in various capacities since his youth from the early 1980s, and was a close ally of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It is not clear if he is a member of the hardliner Paydari party, dominating the newly elected parliament, but he also served a four-year term from 2012-2016 as an Ahmadinejad supporter. He is known as a foreign policy expert who managed foreign students sent abroad by the government.

On Thursday, Kamal Kharrazi was quoted by the semi official ISNA news website as saying, “If they [Israel] dare to strike Iran's nuclear facilities, our level of deterrence will change. We have experienced deterrence at the conventional level so far. If they intend to strike Iran's nuclear capabilities, naturally, it could lead to a change in Iran's nuclear doctrine.”

Kharrazi's statement seemed designed to be a deterrence to any Israeli plans to attack its nuclear facilities. Although he also threatened a change of doctrine if Iran’s existence is threatened, any Israeli attack will most likely be aimed at valuable strategic targets, not at obliterating Iran. It is possible that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advisor was referring to possible Israeli threats against the regime and its leaders, not the existence of Iran as a country.

On April 18, a senior IRGC commander had also warned that Tehran could change its nuclear policies if Israel continues to threaten to attack Iran’s nuclear sites.

“If the fake Zionist regime wants to use the threat of attacking nuclear sites to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable for the Islamic Republic to revise its nuclear doctrine and policies, and deviate from its past declared considerations,” said Ahmad Haghtalab, who oversees the security of Iran’s nuclear sites.

The US is committed to preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said at a press briefing on Thursday.

Earlier this week, in an interview with Al Jazeera, Kamal Kharrazi, an advisor to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, warned that "if [Israel dares] to strike Iran's nuclear facilities, [Iran’s] level of deterrence will change."

"As the President and Secretary have made clear, the United States will ensure one way or another that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon. We continue to use a variety of weapons – or sorry – a variety of tools in pursuit of that goal and all options remain on the table," Miller said in response.

Despite the warning from Kharrazi and Iran’s repeated noncompliance on its nuclear program, Miller acknowledged that diplomacy remains the preferred route for achieving a sustainable resolution.

The spokesperson did point out that diplomatic efforts are currently hindered due to Iran's recent escalatory actions and its lack of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In recent months, a number of officials close to the Supreme Leader have threatened that the Islamic Republic has the capability to build an atomic bomb.

“We have no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran's existence be threatened, there will be no choice but to change our military doctrine,” Kharrazi said, who previously served as Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and currently leads the Strategic Council of Foreign Relations.

The statement comes shortly after the visit of Rafael Grossi, the director-general of the UN nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, to Tehran.

Grossi reported that there was “no timeframe or deadline” for Iran to resolve its nuclear issues, but he emphasized the expectation for Iran to take swift action.

“If they dare to strike Iran's nuclear facilities, our level of deterrence will change. We have experienced deterrence at the conventional level so far. If they intend to strike Iran's nuclear capabilities, naturally, it could lead to a change in Iran's nuclear doctrine,” Kamal Kharrazi said.

He added that Iran has so far refrained from developing nuclear weapons, “But if Iran's existence is threatened, we are forced to change our nuclear doctrine. Recently, military officials also stated that if Israel intends to attack nuclear facilities, reconsidering Iran's nuclear doctrine and policies, and deviating from past declarations, is possible and conceivable.”
Ali-Akbar Salehi, who was foreign minister more than a decade ago and is still a key foreign policy voice in the Iranian government, also said last month that Iran has everything it needed to build a nuclear bomb, as tensions rose with Israel amid the Gaza war.

In a televised interview in April, Salehi, was asked if Iran has achieved the capability of developing a nuclear bomb. Avoiding a direct answer he stated, "We have [crossed] all the thresholds of nuclear science and technology.”

It is believed that Israel conducted two spectacular sabotage operations in 2020 and 2021 against Iran’s large nuclear facility in Natanz, located in the center of the country.

Tehran has always insisted that its nuclear program is peaceful, and it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons. However, its actions since late 2020 point to a trajectory of escalating its nuclear threat by enriching a substantial amount of uranium to 60-percent purity, which has no civilian use.

Kharrazi's new statements are clearly designed to be a deterrence to any Israeli plans to attack its nuclear facilities. Although he also threatened a change of doctrine if Iran’s existence is threatened, any Israeli attack will most likely be aimed at valuable strategic targets, not at obliterating Iran. It is possible that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advisor was referring to possible Israeli threats against the regime and its leaders, not the existence of Iran as a country.

Iran is seen as the main military backer of the Islamist Hamas and is suspected of having assisted the planning of the October 7 attack on Israeli civilians that killed more than one thousand people. Since then, Tehran has relentlessly supported Hamas, and has encouraged its Houthi military proxies to attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea to force Israel to back down.

Tensions led to a direct confrontation when on April 13 Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles at Israel, most of which were shot down by Israeli air defenses and the US, British and Jordanian air forces. Kharrazi expressed his pride on Thursday saying that the myth of Israeli deterrence was shattered both on October 7 and in April.

On April 18, a senior IRGC commander had also warned that Tehran could change its nuclear policies if Israel continues to threaten to attack Iran’s nuclear sites, tacitly suggesting no cooperation with world bodies and building a nuclear bomb.

“If the fake Zionist regime wants to use the threat of attacking nuclear sites to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable for the Islamic Republic to revise its nuclear doctrine and policies, and deviate from its past declared considerations,” said Ahmad Haghtalab, who oversees the security of Iran’s nuclear sites.

Unbeknownst to Swedish authorities, United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) says the IRGC has full access “to all collaborative work product between Iranian universities and their international academic partners”.

The partnerships in question involve at least eight Swedish universities – among them prestigious institutions like Lund University and Uppsala University.

"It is a significant national security issue, and Swedish universities should immediately sever any partnerships with Iranian universities given the risks of such collaboration, which may appear benign on the surface but which can be misused by the IRGC and security institutions in the Islamic Republic," UANI Policy Director Jason Brodsky told Iran International English.

In a letter alerting the Swedish government, UANI CEO Mark Wallace warned the country’s Education Minister that “any collaboration with an Iranian university will support the IRGC and other armed regime elements to further the Islamic Republic’s military program and the IRGC’s nefarious hard and soft power capabilities.”

The IRGC, the country’s paramilitary force, is subject to EU sanctions, and is a US-designated terrorist entity.

Letters outlining the NGO’s findings were signed by Wallace and Alireza Akhondi, a Swedish politician representing the Center Party, and were sent to the universities in question.

“Members of Parliament have summoned the Swedish education minister for questioning,” Brodsky said, adding that Swedish policymakers are taking UANI's investigation seriously.

Alongside the European Jewish Association, Europe Israel Public Affairs the UANI outlined its findings at the Swedish Parliament on Tuesday.

How the IRGC Exploits University Collaborations

Sweden, however, is not the only NATO member state, whose academic institutions have reportedly been targeted by the IRGC.

Last year, the UANI revealed that several top German universities partnered with an Iranian university linked to IRGC and Hezbollah, known for backing terrorist attacks on Israel.

Findings by the Jewish Chronicle in 2023, showed that scientists at 11 British universities helped the Iranian regime develop technology that can be used in its drone programme and fighter jets.

UANI's findings suggest that a strategic agreement was implemented in February 2021 between the IRGC and Iranian universities, exposing any collaborating academic institution to vulnerability.

The accord was implemented by the country’s Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution (SCCR) – overseen and led by the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The body, which sets Iran’s policies on cultural and educational matters, including the mandated hijab, faces several international EU and UK sanctions for gross human rights violations.

The SCCR’s accord mandates the transfer of all research and academic materials' intellectual property and rights to the IRGC and other regime entities – and is reportedly enforced across all Iranian universities.

Called the "Comprehensive Act on Science and Technology in the Defense and Security Field of the Islamic Republic of Iran," its aim is to acquire defense and security sciences and technologies.

UANI says that the agreement specifies that research obtained from universities is to be used for “hostility with enemies in the path of achieving the scientific defense goals of the Islamic Revolution” – and that it may be used against Sweden.

“Given the recently obtained evidence revealed by UANI’s investigation, any partnership with an Iranian university directly benefits the IRGC and other armed elements of the Iranian regime, posing a significant threat of espionage and exploitation,” the UANI CEO said.

The academic disciplines in which the Swedish universities collaborate with Iranian counterparts, the UANI said, align precisely with the IRGC's primary focuses for defense and security, as outlined in the strategic agreement.

These areas include automated and unmanned equipment (drones), aerospace propulsion systems, artificial intelligence, advanced warfare software and military science and technology, advanced electronics, energy, and cyber electronics.

Student exchanges organized under these partnerships also raise concerns about potential exploitation by the IRGC and other regime entities for malign purposes, the UANI found.

UANI says the universities involved in these collaborations are Malmo University, University of Boras, Lund University, Lulea University of Technology, Mid Sweden University, Uppsala University, Linnaeus University, and Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.